Guthrie-Nail, Vera Elizabeth, PD-0125-14

Background

Appellant Vera Elizabeth Guthrie-Nail pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain to conspiracy to commit capital murder; the indictment alleged use of a deadly weapon.
At the plea/sentencing hearing the trial court pronounced sentence and the written judgment initially showed a deadly-weapon entry of "N/A." A later judgment nunc pro tunc added an affirmative deadly-weapon finding.
The trial court’s electronic docket sheet for the plea date included a line indicating a "Deadly Weapon Finding."
The Dallas Court of Appeals considered the docket sheet and upheld the nunc pro tunc judgment; this Court (Court of Criminal Appeals) reversed and remanded in Guthrie-Nail II, finding the record ambiguous about whether the trial court intended to make a deadly-weapon finding and concluding a trial court may decline to enter such a finding.
The State filed this Motion for Rehearing asking the Court to reconsider, arguing (1) the docket sheet should be treated as probative evidence of the trial court’s intent, (2) a trial court’s discretion to decline a deadly-weapon finding is constrained in plea-bargain cases, and (3) longstanding precedent requires an express declination if the judge intends not to impose a deadly-weapon finding when the verdict/judgment otherwise establishes one.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument (Plaintiff)	Appellant's Argument (Defendant)	Held (Court of Criminal Appeals in Guthrie-Nail II)
Whether the trial court’s electronic docket sheet may be considered as evidence of the judge’s intent	Docket sheet is a proper, reliable indicator of the trial judge’s decisions and should resolve ambiguity (citing Ferguson, Stokes)	Docket printout may be unreliable or insufficient; trial court’s oral pronouncement and written judgment control	Court found the record ambiguous and did not rely on the docket sheet in its opinion; concurrence questioned computer printout weight
Whether a trial court has discretion to decline to make an affirmative deadly-weapon finding	Even if courts generally have discretion, in plea bargains the court cannot unilaterally add or remove terms; if plea admits guilt "as alleged" a finding follows	Trial court retains discretion to decline to make a deadly-weapon finding	Court held a trial court may decline to enter a deadly-weapon finding (creating discretion to do so)
Whether plea-bargain limits forbid a judge from declining a deadly-weapon finding	Plea-bargain limits the judge to accept or reject the bargain; judge may not add un-negotiated terms—declining a finding would alter bargained terms and affect parole eligibility	Judge argued discretion exists regardless of plea context	Court did not adopt State’s plea-bargain limitation argument in Guthrie-Nail II; issue left unresolved by reversal/remand outcome
Whether an express oral or written declination is required before a court’s failure to state a deadly-weapon finding will be treated as a declination	Precedent (Polk, Empey, Huskins) treats a guilty finding "as alleged in the indictment" as an affirmative deadly-weapon finding; if judge intends to decline, he must do so expressly	Appellant relied on Hooks to support that entry and notation practices can distinguish making vs entering a finding	Court’s majority concluded ambiguity permitted an inference the judge declined; State urges rehearing, arguing longstanding precedent requires express declination

Key Cases Cited

Stokes v. State, 277 S.W.3d 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (docket entry can reliably indicate judge’s decisions)
Ferguson v. State, 367 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963) (docket entry may show the judgment actually pronounced)
Moore v. State, 295 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (trial court’s role in plea bargains is limited to accepting or rejecting the agreement)
Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (verdict of guilty "as alleged in the indictment" constitutes affirmative deadly-weapon finding when alleged)
Ex parte Empey, 757 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (court-as-finder analog to Polk)
Ex parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (deadly-weapon finding need not be orally pronounced if allegation is clear on indictment)
Hooks v. State, 860 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (distinguishing making a finding from entering/reciting it on the judgment)
Ex parte Minott, 972 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (approving plea bargains that include the trial court not entering a deadly-weapon finding)