Gustafsson v. Aid Auto Brokers, Inc., 212 So. 3d 405

Plaintiffs Gus-tafsson and Stiles bought a used car from Aid Auto, later sued to rescind the sale alleging fraudulent concealment; Aid Auto had a $25,000 motor vehicle dealer surety bond issued by Great American Insurance (GAI).
Plaintiffs sued Aid Auto, Ally Financial (assignee), and GAI; they sought attorney’s fees against Aid Auto and Ally under FDUTPA (Ch. 501) and against GAI under section 627.428.
Parties executed a Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA): vehicle return, contract cancellation, $20,000 to plaintiffs, $1,238.48 costs, Ally to clear credit report, and a fee clause stating plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees “pursuant to § 501, Fla. Stat. only.” The MSA also contained mutual releases.
At the fee hearing plaintiffs’ counsel said they were seeking fees only against the dealer (Aid Auto), not against the bond company (GAI); court entered a fee judgment against Aid Auto, but Aid Auto went out of business and did not pay.
Plaintiffs moved to enforce the MSA against GAI; the trial court ruled GAI liable for plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees but limited recovery to the $25,000 bond amount and entered judgment for $25,000.
Plaintiffs appealed; GAI cross-appealed arguing it was not liable for fees under the MSA. The appellate court resolved the cross-appeal in GAI’s favor, reversed, and remanded with instructions to deny the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the MSA.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the MSA required GAI to pay plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees	MSA language (“we agree that”) shows all defendants agreed plaintiffs are entitled to fees; thus GAI is liable	MSA limits plaintiffs’ entitlement to fees to Chapter 501 (FDUTPA), which does not apply to sureties like GAI, so GAI is not obligated	Held: MSA limited fee entitlement to §501 only; because §501 does not reach sureties like GAI, GAI was not obligated to pay fees under the MSA
Whether GAI’s liability (if any) should be limited to the $25,000 bond	Plaintiffs sought full recovery from GAI (challenging the bond limit)	GAI argued any liability is capped by the penal sum of its surety bond	Court did not reach merits because it resolved cross-appeal holding GAI had no fee obligation; prior trial-court bond-limit ruling rendered moot by reversal

N. Star Beauty Salon, Inc. v. Artzt, 821 So.2d 356 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (standard of review for contract interpretation)
Barone v. Rogers, 930 So.2d 761 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (settlement agreements are contracts interpreted under contract law)
Golf Scoring Sys. Unlimited, Inc. v. Remedio, 877 So.2d 827 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (give effect to plain and ordinary contract language)
Premier Ins. Co. v. Adams, 632 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (prefer interpretation giving reasonable meaning to all provisions)
Levitt v. Levitt, 699 So.2d 755 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (unambiguous contract terms control parties’ intent)
Harrington v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 54 So.3d 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (courts may not rewrite clear contracts)
Dep’t of Ins. v. Teachers Ins. Co., 404 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1981) (Florida law is part of every Florida contract)
Ashby v. Ashby, 651 So.2d 246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (a slight promise constitutes sufficient consideration)
Hubbel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 758 So.2d 94 (Fla. 2000) (FDUTPA does not permit recovery of attorney’s fees from a surety bond issued to a dealer in that context)
Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So.3d 362 (Fla. 2013) (FDUTPA fees cover attorney hours related to FDUTPA claims)