Gulfstream Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Coley
225 So. 3d 906
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Coley sued Gulfstream for breach of contract under his homeowner’s policy arising from Hurricane Wilma; trial court granted summary judgment for Coley on that claim.
- After summary judgment, trial court permitted Coley to amend to add a bad-faith claim (§ 624.155) and a negligence per se claim (§ 825.102); Coley filed an Amended Complaint with three counts.
- The trial court later entered an order styled "Final Judgment" awarding Coley damages on the breach-of-contract claim and stating the bad-faith claim was stayed.
- The order did not mention the negligence per se claim (Count III), which remained pending below and was interdependent with the breach claim.
- Gulfstream appealed the order; this court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order was neither final nor an appealable partial final judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the trial court’s "Final Judgment" appealable as a final order? | Coley treated order as final on Count I and proceeded; implied that only bad-faith claim was stayed. | Gulfstream appealed the Order as a final judgment disposing of Count I. | Not final: Count III remains pending and intertwined with Count I, so order is non-final. |
| If not final, is the order appealable as a partial final judgment under Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(k)? | Coley implied the breach-of-contract adjudication was separable and thus appealable. | Gulfstream argued the order was appealable as a partial final judgment disposing of a distinct cause of action. | Not appealable: negligence per se claim is interdependent with breach claim; Rule 9.110(k) requires disposal of a separate and distinct cause of action. |
| Does the order’s failure to mention Count III constitute a scrivener’s error curing jurisdictional defect? | Coley (implicitly) and Gulfstream’s counsel suggested omission could be a scrivener’s error. | Gulfstream argued omission was inadvertent and could be corrected. | Court declined to treat omission as scrivener’s error given the more fundamental interdependence problem; jurisdiction still lacking. |
| Are claims like negligence per se (under § 825.102) akin to bad-faith claims such that the breach judgment is appealable while negligence claim is pending? | Coley relied on procedural practice permitting bad-faith claims to be stayed and litigated separately after coverage resolution. | Gulfstream contended negligence claim is separate and should not block appeal. | Court held negligence per se is interdependent (unlike typical bad-faith accrual); thus order is not a partial final judgment and appeal must be dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Fridman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 185 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 2016) (discussing sequencing of coverage and bad-faith claims)
- North Am. Capacity Ins. Co. v. C.H., 173 So. 3d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (coverage rulings appealable when only bad-faith remains)
- GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Perez, 199 So. 3d 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (dismissal where remaining counts intertwined with adjudicated count)
- GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Pruitt, 122 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (partial final judgment dismissal where related bad-faith claim pending)
- Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Stathopoulos, 113 So. 3d 957 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (same principle; declaratory relief not appealable when related claims pending)
- Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gerber, 773 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (distinguishing independent negligence action from bad-faith claim)