Gulf Coast Asphalt Co. v. Lloyd
2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 801
| Tex. App. | 2015Background
- Gulf Coast Asphalt (Gulf Coast) sued its former lawyers (Lloyd et al.) for legal malpractice after settling two underlying suits against Chevron (one in California state court for breach/fraud, one in Alabama federal court under RCRA) for $500,000 following dismissals.
- The California suit was dismissed with prejudice for violation of the five-year trial-commencement rule (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 583.310); parties had a written stipulation extending the deadline to Dec. 31, 2009 and later agreed at an Aug. 4, 2009 hearing to continue trial to Feb. 16, 2010. Chevron moved to dismiss as time-barred. The California court dismissed, finding the off‑record agreement insufficient to extend the statutory deadline.
- In the Alabama federal case, Chevron obtained summary judgment and nearly $1 million in fees; both appeals were later settled globally for $500,000 after lawyers advised Gulf Coast (including fee exposure estimates).
- Gulf Coast sued for malpractice alleging failure to secure a valid trial‑deadline extension in California and negligent settlement advice. The lawyers moved for summary judgment arguing the California statute allowed the oral continuance to extend the deadline or that Chevron was estopped from seeking dismissal.
- The Texas trial court granted partial summary judgment narrowly “regarding compliance with section 583 of the California Code of Civil Procedure” but did not state reasons. Gulf Coast sought permissive interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d)/(f).
- The Texas appellate court concluded the trial court’s certification did not identify a controlling legal question whose resolution would materially advance termination, withdrew its prior permission for interlocutory appeal, denied permission, and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Texas trial court’s interlocutory certification identified a controlling question of law with substantial grounds for difference of opinion | Gulf Coast: the partial summary judgment redefined the litigation and a reversal would let Gulf Coast pursue its primary malpractice theory (invalid extension caused dismissal) | Lawyers: the order concerns whether Lloyd complied with the California statute; absent ruling that this disposes all California-related claims, interlocutory appeal won't materially advance the case | Held: Certification was insufficient — the order did not present a controlling legal question that would materially advance termination; permissive appeal denied and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction |
| Whether the California trial court erred as a matter of law in treating an off‑record continuance as insufficient to extend the five‑year rule | Gulf Coast: the continuation to a post‑deadline date (and minute order) extended the statutory period under Cal. law | Lawyers: argued California law permits extension by oral agreement in open court or by continuance and/or estoppel should apply; thus summary judgment should be granted | Held: The Texas court noted possible conflict with California precedent but declined to resolve it in an interlocutory appeal because the Texas certification did not meet statutory standards; factual issues about what occurred off‑record remained unresolved |
| Whether the partial summary judgment effectively decided malpractice as to the California-related claims | Gulf Coast: partial grant impairs Gulf Coast’s theory and is pivotal | Lawyers: the ruling addressed compliance with CA §583 only and is not dispositive of malpractice overall | Held: The ruling was narrow and did not dispose of malpractice claims; damages claim survives, so interlocutory review was not justified |
| Whether an interlocutory appeal would materially advance termination of the malpractice suit | Gulf Coast: reversal would allow Gulf Coast to pursue its preferred theory and could affect settlement/outcome | Lawyers: no showing the issue disposes primary claims; appeal unlikely to materially shorten litigation | Held: No — parties failed to show interlocutory review would materially advance ultimate termination; strict construction of §51.014 required denial |
Key Cases Cited
- Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2007) (Texas courts lack jurisdiction over interlocutory orders except as authorized by statute)
- Hebert v. JJT Constr., 438 S.W.3d 139 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (discussing requirements for trial court statements when granting permissive interlocutory appeal)
- Diamond Prods. Int’l v. Handsel, 142 S.W.3d 491 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (scope of permissive appeal is limited to controlling legal issues necessary to case resolution)
- State Fair of Tex. v. Iron Mountain Info. Mgmt., Inc., 299 S.W.3d 261 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (statutory requirements for interlocutory appeal must be strictly construed)
- In re Estate of Fisher, 421 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (grant of partial summary judgment does not necessarily decide a controlling question of law)
- Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 333 (Cal. 1923) (California precedent holding stipulation/postponement beyond statutory period can extend the statutory trial deadline)