Guity Casildo v. Garland, 19-60322

Petitioner Juan Carlos Guity Casildo, a Honduran national, sought entry to the U.S. in 2017 and applied for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) based on threats/extortion by corrupt police.
To obtain CAT relief he needed to show it is "more likely than not" he would be tortured on return and that torture would be inflicted with consent, acquiescence, or at the instigation of state officials (or under color of law).
The IJ acknowledged that "corrupt police may try to kill" Guity Casildo or his family but concluded there was no government consent or acquiescence; the IJ did not address the color-of-law theory of state involvement.
The BIA dismissed the appeal, treating the IJ’s "may try to kill" remark as a finding that Guity Casildo failed to show the required likelihood of torture; after a prior remand this view was reiterated without addressing the color-of-law issue.
The Fifth Circuit held the BIA either made a factual finding in the first instance or engaged in improper de novo review of the IJ’s possible finding, and that the BIA’s decision lacked substantial-evidence support.
The court vacated and remanded with instructions that the BIA remand to the IJ for a clear factual finding on the likelihood of torture and clarification on state involvement under the color-of-law rule.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Likelihood of torture (CAT standard)	Guity Casildo argued the IJ’s remark shows torture is likely more than not.	Government argued IJ found no likelihood of torture.	Court found the IJ’s remark ambiguous; BIA erred by making or reweighing that factual determination and remanded.
State involvement — acquiescence/consent	Guity Casildo argued state involvement exists under a color-of-law theory despite lack of express acquiescence.	Government argued no government consent/acquiescence; police corruption alone insufficient.	Court ordered BIA to address color-of-law theory on remand and requested IJ clarify whether it applied that theory.
BIA’s role in factual findings	Guity Casildo argued BIA improperly made factual findings and failed to meaningfully consider evidence.	Government defended BIA’s interpretation of IJ findings.	Court held BIA either acted ultra vires by making findings in the first instance or impermissibly engaged in de novo review; decision unsupported by substantial evidence.
Remedy — remand vs. denial	Guity Casildo sought vacatur and remand for clarification and application of correct law.	Government opposed or defended BIA's determination.	Court granted petition, vacated BIA order, and remanded with instruction to remand to IJ for clear findings.

Garcia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 885 (5th Cir.) (CAT requires "more likely than not" standard)
Iruegas-Valdez v. Yates, 846 F.3d 806 (5th Cir.) (state involvement can exist under color-of-law even without express acquiescence)
Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131 (5th Cir.) (substantial-evidence standard for BIA factual findings)
Abdel-Masieh v. INS, 73 F.3d 579 (5th Cir.) (BIA must give meaningful consideration to evidence)
Alvarado de Rodriguez v. Holder, 585 F.3d 227 (5th Cir.) (BIA limited to clear-error review of IJ factual findings)
Zhu v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 521 (5th Cir.) (remand appropriate where IJ’s reasoning is unclear)
Pena Oseguera v. Barr, 936 F.3d 249 (5th Cir.) (remand in interest of clarity)
Wu v. Holder, 571 F.3d 467 (5th Cir.) (instructing BIA to obtain clear factual findings from IJ)
Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603 (5th Cir.) (procedural posture regarding motions for reconsideration)