Guillot v. Russell, 59 F.4th 743

Background

Blake Powell, jailed at Ouachita Correctional Center (OCC), committed suicide on March 13–14, 2020 after four months in custody.
Powell had two prior suicide-watch placements (November and January); staff released him after mental-health evaluation.
On Feb 18 and Mar 3, 2020, staff observed concerning behavior (withdrawal, weight loss, wrist abrasions, report of rape); staff placed Powell on “heightened observation” (an undefined practice) but did not place him on formal suicide watch or obtain timely mental-health follow-up.
OCC’s written Suicide Prevention Policy prescribes suicide watch procedures and training; most deputies on duty that night had received training.
Guillot (on behalf of minor T.A.G.) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Eighth Amendment) against Warden Pat Johnson and Sheriff Jay Russell (official and purported individual capacities), and asserted Louisiana negligence and vicarious-liability claims.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Can Warden Johnson be sued in his official capacity?	Johnson listed on OCC policy cover makes him a policymaker.	Under Louisiana law the sheriff—not the warden—is the final policymaker; Johnson is not a policymaker.	Johnson cannot be sued in his official capacity; plaintiff forfeited contrary argument.
2) Municipal liability for an alleged de facto policy (use of ‘heightened observation’ instead of suicide watch) causing Eighth Amendment violation	OCC had a de facto, widespread custom of using undefined heightened observation to avoid suicide watch, showing deliberate indifference that caused Powell’s death.	No evidence of a widespread, persistent practice; at most isolated incidents; no causal link between any custom and Powell’s March 13 suicide.	No municipal liability: plaintiff failed to show a de facto policy or that any policy was the moving force behind the suicide.
3) Individual-capacity supervisory liability / deliberate indifference by Russell or Johnson	Supervisors knew of Powell’s suicidal history/events (Feb 18, Mar 3) and were deliberately indifferent to his risk on Mar 13.	Plaintiff did not adequately plead individual-capacity claims; facts show at most negligence and no contemporaneous signs of suicide on Mar 13.	Individual-capacity claims forfeited or inadequately pled; in any event plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute of deliberate indifference.
4) State-law negligence and vicarious liability (Louisiana)	Failure to follow OCC policy and failure to obtain mental-health follow-up caused death and satisfy duty/risk.	Officials lacked contemporaneous reason to know Powell was an imminent suicide risk on Mar 13; no ‘‘ease of association’’ between earlier events and the death.	Summary judgment affirmed on state claims: no legal fault because officials had no basis to know Powell posed a present risk on Mar 13.

Key Cases Cited

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (deliberate-indifference standard requires actual knowledge of and disregard of substantial risk)
Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996) (requirements for liability in jail-suicide cases)
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires unconstitutional policy or custom)
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (failure-to-train liability standard: deliberate indifference)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment burden principles)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for genuine dispute of material fact)
Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 2016) (awareness of risk alone does not establish deliberate indifference where response is reasonable)
Jacobs v. W. Feliciana Sheriff’s Dep’t, 228 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2000) (contrast for cases where facts support deliberate indifference)
Flores v. Cnty. of Hardeman, 124 F.3d 736 (5th Cir. 1997) (no deliberate indifference where inmate showed no overt signs immediately before suicide)
Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1984) (standard for establishing customs or de facto policies)