Guillermo Escobedo v. Mark Lund, 760 F.3d 863

Escobedo and co-defendant hosted a party where Escobedo stabbed and killed Justin Younie; Escobedo was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses and sentenced to life.
During closing, the prosecutor made several improper remarks (racial references, drug inferences, projector slide “Innocent people don’t lie”); judge sustained objections, denied mistrial, and gave a curative instruction.
After deliberations began, a report surfaced that a juror had made racial comments; the trial judge dismissed that juror and replaced them with an alternate, then instructed the jury to restart deliberations.
Trial counsel (Pals for Escobedo; Jones for co-defendant) agreed to replace the juror rather than move for a mistrial, explaining strategic reasons (belief jury would be favorable and that retrial risked repeat harms).
Escobedo sought state post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance for failing to move for an automatic mistrial when the juror was replaced; state courts denied relief.
Federal district court granted habeas relief; the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding state courts reasonably applied Strickland and AEDPA standards.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel performed deficiently by not moving for mistrial after juror replacement during deliberations	Escobedo: counsel should have moved for mistrial because Iowa law prohibited replacing a juror after deliberations and would have produced an automatic mistrial	State: law was not clearly settled; counsel’s choice to proceed was a plausible strategic decision	Held: No deficient performance — counsel’s decision was a reasonable strategic choice and not required to predict later state-law interpretation
Whether counsel’s omission prejudiced the defense under Strickland	Escobedo: prejudice shown because an automatic mistrial would have been granted and a new trial might have produced a different outcome	State: evidence against defendants was strong; no reasonable probability of a different verdict at retrial	Held: No Strickland prejudice — state court reasonably concluded Escobedo did not show a reasonable probability of a different result
Whether the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under AEDPA	Escobedo: district court erred by not deferring to state court and by treating prejudice as context-specific extension of Supreme Court law	State: state court’s Strickland application was reasonable under AEDPA	Held: The Eighth Circuit: state court’s application was not an unreasonable extension of Supreme Court precedent; federal relief denied

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (federal habeas courts must defer under AEDPA; pivotal question is whether state court unreasonably applied Strickland)
White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 597 (2014) (limits on treating extensions of Supreme Court precedent as "clearly established" law under §2254(d)(1))
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (discussion of AEDPA deference and Strickland in habeas context)
Wajda v. United States, 64 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 1995) (counsel not required to predict future developments in the law)
Wright v. Nix, 928 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1991) (analysis whether law required an objection to meet Strickland standard)
Hammond v. Hall, 586 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2009) (state court reasonably applied Strickland where counsel was ignorant of an automatic mistrial rule)
Jackson v. Norris, 651 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2011) (standard of review on appeal from district court’s grant of habeas relief)