Guidry v. Lumpkin, 2 F.4th 472

Background

In 1994 Farah Fratta was shot and killed; Robert Fratta had hired Joseph Prystash, who recruited Howard Paul Guidry as the gunman. Neighbors saw an African‑American man leave in a silver/gray car with a headlight out.
Guidry was arrested in 1995 fleeing a bank robbery, found with Fratta’s gun, and confessed to police; his 1997 conviction and death sentence rested largely on that confession.
This court previously granted habeas relief after finding Guidry’s confession was the product of police violation of his right to counsel; the confession was excluded and Guidry was retried in 2007, convicted again, and resentenced to death.
On retrial the State relied on Mary Gipp’s inculpatory testimony (purged of hearsay), Dr. Scott Basinger’s testimony (who had relayed statements Guidry made to him in the first trial), ballistics, possession of Fratta’s gun, and other statements.
Guidry’s successive state habeas petitions were denied/dismissed as an abuse of the writ; his federal §2254 petition was denied by the district court. He seeks a certificate of appealability to appeal four claims: (1) Dr. Basinger’s testimony was fruit of the poisonous tree; (2) Batson challenge to a peremptory strike of a Black juror; (3) Brady suppression of fingerprint evidence; (4) ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and state‑habeas counsel (Strickland/Martinez issues).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Use of Dr. Basinger’s testimony as fruit of the poisonous tree (Harrison/Estelle)	Basinger’s testimony derived from Guidry’s illegally obtained confession and so should be excluded under Harrison/Estelle.	Harrison applies only to compelled testimony by the defendant; Basinger was a third‑party, Guidry did not testify, and Basinger was a private defense expert.	COA denied. No clearly established Supreme Court law extends Harrison to third‑party testimony or supports Guidry’s Estelle claim; AEDPA bars relief.
2) Batson challenge to State’s peremptory strike of Black juror (Washington)	Strike was racially motivated; NAACP membership and other reasons were pretext for discrimination.	Prosecutor offered race‑neutral reasons (church membership, views on crime, discrimination experience, demeanor, NAACP membership, possible connection to defense witness); trial judge credited them.	COA denied. The prosecutor’s explanations were facially valid; record lacks clear and convincing evidence of purposeful discrimination.
3) Brady claim re: withheld fingerprint evidence linking Vernon Barlow	State suppressed exculpatory fingerprint files tying Barlow to the scene; that evidence was favorable and material.	State had an open‑file policy; the materials were available in the State’s production (multiple boxes) and discovered with reasonable diligence; no evidence show State actually suppressed items.	COA denied. Guidry cannot show suppression (cause), so procedural default is not excused; no reasonable jurist would debate this.
4) Ineffective assistance of counsel (trial, appellate, state habeas; mitigation; investigation)	Trial/appellate/habeas counsel failed to investigate fingerprints, suspects, ballistics, experts, and mitigation, producing deficient performance and prejudice; Martinez excuses defaults.	Many alleged failures lack merit; counsel conducted extensive investigations and mitigation work; Martinez does not extend to IAAC claims and habeas counsel performance generally is not constitutionally actionable as cause; procedural defaults stand.	COA denied. Most IAC claims are procedurally defaulted; Martinez/Davila limitations apply; the underlying IATC claims are not substantial under Strickland, and trial counsel’s performance and mitigation investigation were reasonable.

Key Cases Cited

Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) (testimony compelled by an unconstitutional confession may be inadmissible on retrial)
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (scope of Harrison and limits on use of compelled testimony)
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (Fifth Amendment protections for psychiatric evaluations by State‑appointed examiners)
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (three‑step test for race‑based peremptory strikes)
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (prosecutor’s explanation for strikes need not be persuasive, only facially race‑neutral)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part ineffectiveness standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution’s duty to disclose favorable, material evidence)
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (narrow equitable exception permitting cause for default of trial‑IAC claims when initial‑review state habeas counsel was ineffective)
Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017) (limits Martinez; Martinez does not extend to appellate‑IAC claims)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (AEDPA standard for state‑court adjudications)
Miller‑El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (standard for issuing a certificate of appealability)