Guidash v. Tome, 66 A.3d 122

Guidash appeals a circuit court modification of his child support obligation for Joseph, arguing the Separation Agreement precludes support, lack of material change in circumstances, and erroneous factual findings.
The parties married in 1991 and separated in 2001; they signed a Separation Agreement providing joint custody, a rent-free period for Tome and the children, Guidash paying mortgage costs and half medical expenses, Tome transferring her interest in the home for $25,000 and waiving pension rights for $20,000.
The Separation Agreement stated there would be no child support and that it could not be modified by any court during the ten-year housing arrangement.
From 2001 to 2011 Tome, James, and Joseph resided in the marital home; Guidash paid mortgage, insurance, taxes, health insurance for the children, and $25,000 in 2004 as part of the agreement.
In 2011 Tome moved out; Guidash paid $20,000 to Tome for the pension waiver, some of which was used for rent for Tome; Tome began paying rent and transportation costs for Joseph to attend specialized schooling.
In December 2011 Tome filed for modification seeking a Maryland guidelines-based child support order; a master found a material change in circumstances and calculated support at $1,140/month with transportation and health-insurance considerations; circuit court adopted the master's findings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
May the court modify a non-modifiable separation agreement?	Guidash argues the agreement binds court and parties from modification.	Guidash contends public policy supports honoring non-modifiability.	Non-modifiability is void; court may modify for child's best interests.
Was there a material change in circumstances justifying modification?	Tome asserts change due to moving out and new housing costs.	Guidash contends no significant change beyond what was anticipated.	Yes; Tome’s move and new housing costs constitute a material change.
Did the court properly treat Guidash’s rental income and Tome’s transportation/education expenses?	Guidash argues $1,500 rental income and $433 transportation expenses were misapplied.	Tome's transportation and Joseph’s education costs were supported by evidence and properly included.	The master’s calculations and the circuit court’s deference were proper.
Should the shared custody rules have applied for the child support calculation?	Guidash claims joint custody should alter the worksheet used.	Tome contested shared custody thresholds; testimony supported sole custody basis.	Court properly used the relevant custody framework and did not misapply the guidelines.

Walsh v. Walsh, 833 Md. 492 (Md. 1994) (court must analyze guidelines when approving deviating support)
Ruppert v. Fish, 84 Md. App. 665 (Md. Ct. App. 1990) (child support modifiable despite agreements where best interests require)
Shrivastava v. Mates, 93 Md. App. 320 (Md. Ct. App. 1992) (child support modifiable despite separation agreements)
Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486 (Md. 1991) (appellate review deferential on master findings in family law)
Knott v. Knott, 146 Md. App. 282 (Md. Ct. App. 2002) (guidelines analysis required in consent orders for child support)
Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Administration, 323 Md. 106 (Md. 1991) (duty to support cannot be waived; modification permissible to protect child)
Tannehill v. Tannehill, 88 Md. App. 4 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (guidelines applicability and departure considerations)
Ruppert v. Fish, 84 Md. App. 665 (Md. Ct. App. 1990) (modification when material change in circumstances)