Guess v. WellPath
5:19-cv-00360
E.D. Ark.Feb 22, 2021Background
- Plaintiff Chad E. Guess, an ADC inmate, alleges that on July 23, 2019 a stainless-steel sheet lacerated his right knee to the bone; Dentist Joshua Farr and an unnamed dental assistant (Doe) stitched the wound. Guess claims Farr/Doe were unqualified, a PA (Onyia-Murphy) refused to treat him, and administrators rejected his grievances.
- Court allowed individual-capacity § 1983 claims to proceed against Farr, Doe, WellPath, Chisom, Moore, Onyia-Murphy, Warden Joe Page, and Asst. Supt. Thomas Hurst; Farr and Doe had not been served at the time of the RD.
- Hurst and Page moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim; Chisom, Moore, WellPath, and Onyia-Murphy moved for summary judgment arguing Guess failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA.
- ADC grievance policy requires inmates to file Step One (informal), Step Two (formal), and Step Three (appeal) and to specifically name individuals and include required attachments; failure to follow procedure can result in denial as untimely or procedurally defective.
- Four potentially relevant grievances: TU-19-00703 (untimely Step One filed 27 days after incident); TU-19-00875 (Step Three decision issued after Guess filed suit); TU-19-00928 and TU-19-00937 (denied at Step Three for missing required attachments).
- Magistrate Judge recommends: grant Hurst/Page motion (dismiss for failure to state a claim) and grant summary judgment for Chisom, Moore, WellPath, and Onyia-Murphy (dismiss without prejudice for failure to exhaust); dismiss Farr and Doe as well on the same exhaustion grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Supervisor liability of Hurst and Page | As unit supervisors they are notified of emergencies and thus liable for the injury response | Allegations are conclusory; no personal involvement shown; supervisory/vicarious liability not allowed under § 1983 | Dismissed for failure to state a claim; supervisory liability requires personal participation or deliberate indifference |
| PLRA exhaustion as to Chisom, Moore, WellPath, Onyia-Murphy | Grievances were filed about the knee injury and treatment | Guess failed to fully and properly exhaust ADC grievance procedure (timeliness, naming, attachments, final Step 3 before suit) | Summary judgment for defendants; claims dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust |
| Effect of specific grievances (TU-19-00703, TU-19-00875, TU-19-00928, TU-19-00937) | These grievances show administrative remedies were pursued | TU-19-00703 untimely; TU-19-00875 final decision issued after suit filed; TU-19-00928/00937 rejected at Step 3 for missing attachments | Court: TU-19-00703 untimely; TU-19-00875 not exhausted before filing; TU-19-00928/00937 procedurally defective — none suffice to exhaust claims |
| Dismissal of unserved defendants Farr and Doe | Plaintiff seeks to proceed against Farr and Doe for alleged inadequate treatment | The exhaustion defense raised by other defendants applies equally to Farr and Doe | Claims against Farr and Doe recommended dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust despite lack of service |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (complaint must plead sufficient factual content to state a plausible claim)
- Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (PLRA requires exhaustion of available administrative remedies as defined by the prison)
- Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (exhaustion requires using all agency steps and doing so properly)
- Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624 (exhaustion must be complete at time of filing; dismissal mandatory if not)
- Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439 (deliberate indifference requires prison officials actually knew of and disregarded serious medical need)
- Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F.3d 637 (supervisory liability under § 1983 requires personal participation or deliberate indifference)
- Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128 (supervisory liability requires specific facts of personal involvement)
- Angelo Iafrate Constr. LLC v. Potashnick Constr., Inc., 370 F.3d 715 (a defense that applies to all defendants can operate as a discharge for non-moving defendants)