Guerra v. Shinseki
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 8900
| Fed. Cir. | 2011Background
- Guerra, a Vietnam-era veteran, suffers multiple service-connected disabilities totaling 100% combined, but none individually at 100%.
- Section 1114(s) provides extra monthly compensation to totally disabled veterans who have either an independently ratable 60%+ disability or are housebound due to service-connected disabilities.
- The Veterans Court held Guerra failed §1114(s) threshold because he lacked a single 100% rating, following Bradley v. Peake (2008).
- Guerra argues §1114(s) allows SMC for totally disabled veterans based on a total rating from multiple disabilities, even if no single disability is 100%.
- The majority opinion deferentially interprets §1114(s) and upholds the Veterans Court, relying on agency regulation 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(i) and Chevron deference.
- The dissent argues plain language and statutory history support a total disability under §1114(j) suffices for §1114(s), even with no single 100% rating.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is a single 100% disability required for §1114(s)? | Guerra: total rating suffices via combined 100% | Shinseki: requires a single 100% disability | Total rating via combination insufficient; single 100% required |
| Does the DVA interpretation of §1114(s) deserve Chevron deference? | Guerra: agency reading honors statutory language | Shinseki: deference warranted to agency interpretation | Yes, defer to DVA interpretation supporting single 100% requirement |
| Did APA rulemaking apply to 1995 Manual change and 1991 GC opinion? | Guerra: pre-1995 Manual reflects agency rulemaking; invalid without APA | Shinseki: manuals and opinions are interpretive, not substantive rules | APA procedures not required for those interpretive changes |
| Do other §1114 provisions affect the meaning of §1114(s) here? | Guerra: other sections support combined-total interpretation | Shinseki: §1114(s) text and context distinguish total-based SMC | Text and context support single-disability interpretation |
| Should the case be remanded to resolve whether Guerra’s PTSD would alter the total rating? | Guerra: remand to determine if combined total excluding PTSD yields 100% | Shinseki: no remand necessary given the 100% requirement | Remand not necessary for majority decision; dissent urges remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Guillory v. Shinseki, 603 F.3d 981 (Fed.Cir.2010) (explains combined ratings and 1114(s) context; supports single 100% prerequisite)
- Bradley v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 280 (Vet. App. 2008) (veteran with TDIU context and §1114(s) eligibility nuances)
- Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326 (Fed.Cir.2003) (preserves deference to agency interpretation when statute is ambiguous)
- Haas v. Peake, 544 F.3d 1306 (Fed.Cir.2008) (distinguishes interpretive vs. substantive agency rules for APA purposes)
- Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (Supreme Ct. 1994) (benefits statutes construed in veterans' favor; ambiguity resolved for beneficiaries)
- Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87 (Supreme Ct. 1995) (distinguishes interpretive rules from substantive rules for APA)