Guadalupe Campos v. United States
888 F.3d 724
| 5th Cir. | 2018Background
- Campos, a noncitizen previously ordered removed in 2012, pleaded guilty in 2013 to attempted illegal reentry, served 11 months, and while incarcerated was granted U nonimmigrant status and issued an Employment Authorization Document (EAD).
- On November 14, 2013, after reporting to probation with her child, CBP officers detained Campos, despite her presenting an EAD, transported her to the PDN Port of Entry, and removed her to Mexico the same day.
- Campos sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for false arrest and false imprisonment; the Government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, invoking the FTCA discretionary function exception.
- The district court dismissed, relying in part on Campos’s prior conviction and removal order; the court stated it had not considered the substance of many exhibits but used conviction information for context.
- On appeal the Fifth Circuit considered whether (1) the discretionary function exception bars the FTCA claims, and (2) the law enforcement proviso of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) permits suit despite that exception.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the discretionary function exception bars Campos’s FTCA claims | EAD conclusively proved lawful presence; officers had no discretion to detain | Officers had discretion under statutes and procedures; investigation and enforcement choices are discretionary | The discretionary function exception applies — officers had discretion and no statute or regulation removed that discretion |
| Whether an EAD (I‑766) compelled release and prohibited arrest under § 1357(a)(2) | EAD is definitive proof of lawful status and precludes arrest/detention | No statute/regulation specifically required release on sight of an EAD; Section 1357(a)(2)’s “reasonable belief” is judgmental | No controlling regulation/statute removed officers’ discretion; EAD did not eliminate reasonable-belief inquiry |
| Whether the law enforcement proviso (§ 2680(h)) overrides the discretionary function exception and allows suit | Proviso always trumps the discretionary-function exception for covered intentional torts | Proviso must be harmonized with discretionary-function exception; both can apply and be analyzed together | Proviso applies to law enforcement officers but does not automatically negate the discretionary-function exception; here conduct did not reach the egregious misconduct that would preclude the exception |
| Whether dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be with prejudice | N/A (not raised by Campos) | Dismissal with prejudice is proper final judgment | Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be with prejudice; court must dismiss without prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158 (5th Cir.) (standard for Rule 12(b)(1) review)
- Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981) (framework for district court jurisdictional fact‑finding)
- Gaubert v. United States, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (discretionary function exception test — statutory/policy mandates remove discretion)
- Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988) (clarifies when discretionary function exception does not apply)
- Tsolmon v. United States, 841 F.3d 378 (5th Cir.) (applying discretionary-function exception to CBP detention/investigation)
- Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1987) (harmonizing discretionary-function exception and law enforcement proviso)
- Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50 (2013) (proviso covers acts/omissions of law enforcement officers within scope of employment)
- Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559 (5th Cir.) (discusses limits of discretionary-function exception)
- United States v. Elashyi, 554 F.3d 480 (5th Cir.) (context on scope of discretion for government actors)