Grundy v. Lincoln Park Zoo
2011 IL App (1st) 102686
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2011Background
- Mary Grundy was injured after tripping over the steel leg of a sign at the Park Place Café in Lincoln Park Zoo.
- Defendants included Lincoln Park Zoo, Levy Restaurants, and Chicago Park District; Lincoln Park Zoo appealed.
- Circuit court certified four questions under Rule 308 about whether the sign is a condition of public property under 3-106, whether it is affixed to the property under Stein, and whether it is public property under 3-101, plus whether Stein remains good law after Callaghan.
- The Supreme Court directed review of the certified questions; the sign remained stationary for the Zoo’s summer season.
- The court answered: the sign is a condition of public property under 3-106; Stein’s affixed-to-property requirement does not apply; the sign can be public property under 3-101; Stein’s requirement is not good law; the case was remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does a stationary but movable sign constitute a condition of public property under 3-106? | Grundy argues yes, the sign’s placement creates a condition. | Zoo argues no, not a condition of property. | Yes, the sign is a condition of public property under 3-106. |
| Is the sign affixed to the property under Stein’s interpretation of 3-106? | Grundy relies on the sign as a qualifying condition. | Zoo argues Stein controls and requires affixation. | Moot. |
| Can the sign qualify as public property under 3-101? | Grundy contends the sign is public property because it is owned/leased by a local public entity. | Zoo contends it may still be public property. | Yes, it can be public property under 3-101. |
| Is Stein’s affixed-to-the-property interpretation still good law after Callaghan? | Grundy argues Stein remains valid in Illinois law. | Zoo argues Callaghan undermines Stein. | No, Stein’s affixation requirement is not controlling. |
Key Cases Cited
- McCuen v. Peoria Park District, 163 Ill. 2d 125 (1994) (movable but injury-related to property condition; immunity dependent on property’s condition)
- Sylvester v. Chicago Park District, 179 Ill. 2d 500 (1998) (movable item; discussed recreational property immunity under 3-106)
- Rexroad v. City of Springfield, 207 Ill. 2d 33 (2003) (distinguished Sylvester; movable items and property’ use affect immunity)
- Stein v. Chicago Park District, 323 Ill. App. 3d 574 (2001) (affixed-to-property interpretation of 3-106 criticized)
- Callaghan v. Village of Clarendon Hills, 401 Ill. App. 3d 287 (2010) (rejected Stein’s affixed-to-property; treated 3-106 broadly)
- Moore v. Chicago Park District, 2011 IL App (1st) 103325 (2011) (snow/ice not a condition under 3-106; conflicted with Stein; dissent favored broader view)
- First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128 (1976) (Talandis doctrine on certified questions and scope of review)