Grundhoefer v. Sorin
20 N.E.3d 775
Ill. App. Ct.2014Background
- Grundhoefer, a licensed physician, was married to David Sorin; David died in a fall while climbing outside the Sorins' residence in 2008.
- David's probate estate was filed and Grundhoefer was appointed administrator, with a dispute over ownership of a 2007 Hyundai Santa Fe.
- During the probate, the Sorins filed a wrongful death suit against Grundhoefer alleging negligent Ambien prescription and that it proximately caused David's death.
- Grundhoefer learned of the suit from a Chicago Sun-Times article and reported it to her malpractice insurer, employer, and the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation.
- The probate proceeding terminated in the Sorins' favor on August 17, 2010; the Sorins voluntarily dismissed the wrongful death suit on October 28, 2010 and did not refile.
- Grundhoefer amended her complaint in January 2011 asserting malicious prosecution (Count I) and defamation per se (Counts II–V); motions to dismiss under 2-615 were granted, leading to this appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Probable cause in malicious prosecution | Sorin lack probable cause when filing the wrongful death suit. | The Sorins had an honest, reasonable belief in merit of the claim based on prescribing Ambien to a sleepwalk-prone patient. | Malicious prosecution claim survived; lack of probable cause pleaded can be inferred at 2-615 stage. |
| Special damages under 2-109 | Distinct special damages must be pled for malicious prosecution arising from medical malpractice. | Section 2-109 allows no pleading of special injury for medical malpractice-based prosecutions. | 2-109 applies; plaintiff not required to plead special injury; error to dismiss for lack of special damages. |
| Defamation per se sufficiency | Publication of wrongful death claims to Chicago Sun-Times imputed criminal conduct and professional dishonesty. | Allegations were insufficiently pleaded; information-and-belief language is not properly supported by facts. | Counts for defamation per se were properly dismissed for lack of precise factual pleading; affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50 (Ill. 2001) (malicious prosecution elements; standard for absence of probable cause)
- Johnson v. Target Stores, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 56 (Ill. App. 2003) (state-of-mind test for probable cause in malicious prosecution)
- Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558 (Ill. 2006) (defamation per se—pleading damages not required; heightened pleading standard emphasized)
- Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill. 2d 478 (Ill. 2009) (pleading defamation per se requires precision; information-and-belief must be supported by facts)
- Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77 (Ill. 1996) (defamation per se damages presumed; require precise pleading when alleging per se claims)
- Fabiano v. City of Palos Hills, 336 Ill. App. 3d 635 (Ill. App. 2002) (definition of probable cause for malicious prosecution)
- Bank of Lyons v. Schultz, 78 Ill. 2d 235 (Ill. 1980) (special injury analysis in malicious prosecution doctrine)