Grosinger v. Thill
2015 ND 295
| N.D. | 2015Background
- Maurice Thill was civilly committed in 2012 as a sexually dangerous individual; he petitioned for discharge in 2013 (denied) and again in 2014/2015.
- Two evaluators: Dr. Jennifer Krance (state hospital psychologist) recommended continued commitment; Dr. Stacey Benson (court-appointed) disagreed on dangerousness.
- District court held a 2015 hearing, found Thill remains a sexually dangerous individual, and denied discharge; Thill appealed.
- Thill conceded the State proved prior sexually predatory conduct and diagnosed disorders (Pedophilic Disorder, Sexual Sadism Disorder); his challenge targeted the third prong—likelihood to reoffend—and ability to control behavior.
- The district court relied in part on Dr. Krance’s report and referenced an erroneous belief that Thill reoffended after treatment; the State acknowledged no reoffense but argued other evidence supported commitment.
- The appellate majority found the district court’s factual findings were conclusory and insufficient under Rule 52(a), requiring specific factual findings about risk and control; remanded for more detailed findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court’s denial of discharge was supported by clear and convincing evidence | Thill argued findings on likelihood to reoffend and inability to control behavior were unsupported and relied on a factual error (alleged post-treatment conviction) | State argued continued commitment was supported by diagnoses, treatment history, and behavioral evidence despite no post-treatment conviction | Court reversed and remanded: findings were conclusory and did not specify factual basis for risk/control determinations, violating Rule 52(a) |
| Whether district court made adequate findings of fact as required by N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a) | Thill asserted findings were general/conclusory and inadequate for appellate review | State implicitly contended findings and expert testimony sufficed to show dangerousness | Court held findings were inadequate—must state specific facts relied upon—remanded for detailed findings |
| Applicability of substantive due process standard re: ability to control behavior | Thill challenged that court did not adequately find serious difficulty controlling behavior as required by Crane standard | State maintained evidence (diagnosis, behavior, expert testimony) supported such a finding | Court required explicit factual findings addressing whether Thill has serious difficulty controlling behavior; remanded |
| Whether appellate review should defer to district court credibility determinations | Thill noted conflict between experts; argued court failed to identify which evidence it credited | State emphasized deference to district court credibility decisions | Majority reiterated deference but explained detailed findings are still required when evidence conflicts; remanded for specificity |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Thill, 2014 ND 89, 845 N.W.2d 330 (prior appeal addressing commitment)
- In re Matter of J.T.N., 2011 ND 231, 807 N.W.2d 570 (standard of review — modified clearly erroneous)
- Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (requirement to show serious difficulty controlling behavior for civil commitment)
- In re Matter of Hehn, 2008 ND 36, 745 N.W.2d 631 (discussing Crane due process requirement)
- In re Johnson, 2015 ND 71, 861 N.W.2d 484 (Rule 52(a) findings required)
- In re Matter of R.A.S., 2008 ND 185, 756 N.W.2d 771 (conclusory findings inadequate under Rule 52(a))