GRISHAM v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY
2017 OK 69
| Okla. | 2017Background
- Brent and Deborrah Grisham and Dan and Lee Rutledge sued Oklahoma City after a sewer backup, alleging property damage and personal-injury/nuisance harms.
- Plaintiffs filed GTCA pre-suit claim forms provided by the City that checked and described only property damage; the City denied the claims.
- Plaintiffs filed suit in District Court asserting both property and personal-injury/nuisance claims; a jury returned verdicts exceeding the GTCA property cap.
- At trial the court sustained the City’s demurrers as to personal-injury/nuisance claims, finding the GTCA notices did not provide sufficient notice of personal injuries, and reduced judgment to the $25,000 property-damage cap.
- The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed; the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a GTCA notice that specifies property damage but not "any other loss" suffices to support later personal-injury claims arising from the same occurrence.
- The Supreme Court held (prospectively) that a notice claiming only property damage is sufficient for property claims but does not suffice to notify the government of "any other loss" (e.g., personal injury); remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a GTCA pre-suit "claim" notice that identifies property damage can also serve as notice for personal-injury/"any other loss" arising from same occurrence | Grisham: GTCA notice need not specify types of damages with particularity; plaintiffs substantially complied and notice covered entire occurrence | City: Notice must specify property vs. other types of loss; plaintiffs' forms gave only property notice and cannot support personal-injury claims | Held: A notice specifying only "property damage" is sufficient for property claims but is not sufficient notice for "any other loss" (personal injury) unless the notice also indicates such other loss; rule applied prospectively |
| Whether the GTCA requires particularization of damage types as a mandatory jurisdictional element of notice | Grisham: §156's requirements do not mandate splitting by damage type; substantial compliance suffices | City: §156 and the Act require specific identification of damage types to enable limits and fiscal planning | Held: §156 does not require mandatory specification of damage types; claim definition and limits treat damage types differently for liability caps, but specification is not a mandatory element—however claimant may elect to limit notice to property, which forecloses later personal-injury claims absent separate timely notice |
| Effect of filing multiple GTCA notices (split notices) for different damage types arising from same occurrence | Grisham: plaintiffs need not file separate notices; single notice may cover all damages | City: Claimants must file additional notices if initial notice limited to property | Held: GTCA neither prohibits nor requires single notice; split notices are permitted but create procedural traps because denial of a particular notice starts the limitations period for that notice |
| Retroactivity of the Court’s interpretive rule | Grisham: (implicitly) apply to case | City: (implicitly) existing precedent should control | Held: New clarification will be given prospective effect; court remanded for new trial consistent with prospective rule and fairness considerations |
Key Cases Cited
- Minie v. Hudson, 934 P.2d 1082 (Okla. 1997) (statutory "shall" interpreted as legislative mandate; discussing written-claim requirement and substantial compliance)
- Truelock v. City of Del City, 967 P.2d 1183 (Okla. 1998) (sewer-backup damages for inconvenience, annoyance, discomfort are "any other loss," not property damage)
- Kennedy v. City of Talihina, 265 P.3d 757 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011) (permitting split GTCA notices; denying recovery where suit not timely filed after denial of the original property-only claim)
- Shanbour v. Hollingsworth, 918 P.2d 73 (Okla. 1996) (compliance with written notice and denial prerequisites are prerequisites to suing under GTCA)
- Bomford v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 440 P.2d 713 (Okla. 1968) (prospective application / fairness doctrines when courts announce new procedural standards)