Grisafo v. Holllingshead
2019 Ohio 3763
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Kevin Grisafo and Geraldine Hollingshead divorced in 2004; their separation agreement and final decree awarded Hollingshead 50% of Grisafo’s Police & Firemen’s Pension and all post-retirement benefits.
- A 2004 Division of Property Order (DPO) accepted by OP&F designated Hollingshead’s share to come from Grisafo’s age-and-service retirement benefit only; she did not select disability benefits on the form.
- Grisafo stopped active police work in 2016 due to a hip injury and began receiving OP&F disability benefits in November 2016; he will not be eligible for age-and-service retirement until September 2020.
- From 2017–2018 Hollingshead sought: (a) an amended DPO to include disability benefits, (b) relief from the 2004 judgments, and (c) an order compelling OP&F to produce Grisafo’s records; Grisafo opposed and sought attorney fees.
- The magistrate denied all three motions, awarded Grisafo $5,000 in attorney fees, and the trial court adopted that decision; Hollingshead appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Grisafo) | Defendant's Argument (Hollingshead) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Is the 2004 DPO consistent with the final decree? | DPO mirrors the decree: both give Hollingshead 50% of age-and-service retirement benefits. | DPO is inconsistent because it excludes Grisafo’s current disability benefits, which she says fall within the decree’s grant of post-retirement benefits. | DPO is consistent; both award 50% of age-and-service retirement benefits; disability benefits are not presently covered. |
| 2. Is Hollingshead entitled to Grisafo’s disability benefits? | Disability benefits are payable in lieu of retirement only when participant is eligible for retirement; Grisafo not yet eligible so she has no claim. | Disability benefits are effectively retirement benefits and thus within her 50% share. | Hollingshead is not entitled now; disability benefits are not marital/retirement benefits until Grisafo becomes eligible in Sept. 2020 and she bears burden to prove they substitute for retirement. |
| 3. Should the magistrate’s allegedly conflicting statements be clarified? | Magistrate’s language that Hollingshead “may be entitled” upon retirement is dicta and not adopted as a binding finding. | The magistrate’s statements conflict and should be clarified to direct amendment of the DPO. | No clarification required; the speculative statement was obiter dictum and the court did not err in declining to adopt it as a holding. |
| 4. Should OP&F be ordered to produce Grisafo’s personal history record? | Production was unnecessary because Grisafo cannot convert disability to retirement before Sept. 2020; request was too vague and moot. | Records were necessary to determine whether disability benefits are in lieu of retirement and to prepare an amended DPO. | Denial affirmed as moot/within discretion; information would not change that Grisafo is not yet retirement-eligible. |
| 5. Was the $5,000 attorney-fee award improper? | Fees were reasonable and incurred because Hollingshead filed motions to undo the 2004 agreement; court considered statutory factors and local rule evidence. | Award was punitive and inequitable because she had a right to seek benefits. | Fee award affirmed; trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding $5,000 equitable and reasonably supported. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172 (1994) (abuse-of-discretion standard for review of Civ.R. 60(B) motions)
- Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St.2d 348 (1981) (standard for reviewing property division in divorce)
- Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St.2d 244 (1974) (contract interpretation governs separation agreements)
- Forstner v. Forstner, 68 Ohio App.3d 367 (1990) (separation agreements treated as contracts construed to effect parties’ intent)
- Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St.3d 578 (1996) (abuse-of-discretion review principles)
- Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143 (1991) (standards for attorney-fee review)
- Cockerham v. Cockerham, 83 N.E.3d 999 (2017) (disability payments become retirement benefits to the extent they equal what retirement would pay when participant becomes retirement-eligible)