Grimes v. Van Hook-Williams
302 Mich. App. 521
| Mich. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Plaintiff (alleged father) sued under the Revocation of Paternity Act seeking DNA testing, recognition as biological father, custody, and parenting time for a child born Nov. 4, 2011.
- Plaintiff admitted he knew at the start of the relationship that defendant was married to Dante Williams, but alleged he believed she was separated and would obtain a divorce.
- Defendant denied separation and asserted plaintiff lacked statutory standing because he knew (or had reason to know) the mother was married at conception.
- A Friend of the Court referee and the circuit court found undisputed evidence that plaintiff knew the mother was married; the court granted summary disposition for defendant for lack of standing.
- Plaintiff challenged the ruling on statutory and constitutional (due process and equal protection) grounds; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiff lacked standing under MCL 722.1441(3)(a)(i) because he knew or had reason to know the mother was married at conception | Jansen (plaintiff) argued he reasonably believed the mother had divorced Williams and thus did not know she remained married | Williams (defendant) argued plaintiff admitted knowledge of the marriage and had no evidence of a divorce, so he had knowledge or reason to know | Court: No genuine factual dispute; plaintiff knew or had reason to know the mother was married, so he lacked statutory standing |
| Whether the statutory standing requirement violates due process (fundamental parental rights) | Plaintiff asserted a liberty interest in establishing paternity and parenting rights | Defendant argued putative fathers of children born during a marriage lack the constitutional liberty interest to override the marital presumption | Court: No constitutional violation; putative father lacks a due-process right to assert paternity against an extant marital family (Michael H and Michigan precedent) |
| Whether the statute violates equal protection by treating alleged fathers differently than mothers | Plaintiff argued the knowledge requirement discriminates based on gender because mothers can bring the action without such a knowledge protection | Defendant argued mothers and alleged fathers are not similarly situated regarding birth and proof of parentage | Court: Classification is permissible; mothers and alleged fathers are not similarly situated and gender-based distinction is substantially related to governmental interests |
| Whether the child has a constitutional right to care/filiation that would alter the outcome | Plaintiff raised this argument on appeal | Defendant did not rely on this to defeat standing below | Court: Declined to address as it was unpreserved; noted the issue is unresolved and, in any event, legal parentage would control |
Key Cases Cited
- Spiek v. Dep’t of Transp., 456 Mich 331 (summary disposition standard and appellate review)
- Kennedy v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 274 Mich App 710 (summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10))
- West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 Mich 177 (definition of genuine issue of material fact)
- In re Daniels Estate, 301 Mich App 450 (Revocation of Paternity Act governs actions to determine presumed father is not child’s father)
- Serafin v. Serafin, 401 Mich 629 (historic modification of Lord Mansfield’s Rule and presumption of legitimacy)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57 (parental liberty interest in childrearing)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 US 745 (parental rights as fundamental liberty interest)
- Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US 110 (no constitutional right for putative father to challenge paternity of child born into marriage)
- Sinicropi v. Mazurek, 273 Mich App 149 (Michigan precedent that putative father lacks constitutional liberty interest to commence paternity action for child born in wedlock)
- Nguyen v. INS, 533 US 53 (men and women not similarly situated re: proof of biological parenthood)