Grimes v. United States, 18-CF-132

Officers stopped an SUV for suspected speeding; occupants were driver Marcus Wallace, front-seat passenger Mark Grimes, and back-seat passenger Angelina Mitchell.
Wallace told officers they could “flip this thing inside out”; a search produced a .40 caliber handgun wrapped in a shirt and a 14-round magazine in a bag on the back seat.
Forensic lifts produced prints from the magazine; a comparison to a 2013 MPD fingerprint card showed one lift matched Grimes and another matched a person not in the car.
Grimes was indicted on five weapons-related counts; the jury acquitted him of the firearm- and ammunition-related counts but convicted him only of possession of a high-capacity magazine.
At trial the government sought to admit the 2013 fingerprint card (Officer Usher’s notations) under the business-records exception; defense objected under the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules.
The court affirmed the conviction: it held the fingerprint card non-testimonial and admissible as a business record; it held Wallace’s “flip this thing inside out” remark was inadmissible implied-hearsay but that admission was harmless.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Grimes)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether a 2013 fingerprint card is "testimonial" under the Confrontation Clause	The card’s notations identifying the prints as Grimes’s were testimonial forensic assertions made with a prosecutorial purpose	Prints were taken as routine processing/booking for administrative purposes, not primarily to create trial evidence	Non-testimonial: card was created in routine booking; no objective evidence it was made primarily for prosecution
Whether the 2013 fingerprint card is admissible under the business-records hearsay exception	The card was prepared with an eye toward litigation and thus is excluded from the business-records exception	The card was a regular-course booking record and satisfies the business-records requirements	Admissible: trial court did not err; government’s unchallenged representations supported business-records foundation
Whether Wallace’s statement to officers—"you can flip this thing inside out"—was admissible	The remark implied Wallace did not possess a gun and was offered for its truth; thus it was hearsay and inadmissible	The remark was non-assertive (permission) or admissible as state-of-mind evidence showing Wallace’s belief	Error: statement was an implied assertion of innocence and inadmissible; state-of-mind exception did not apply; error was harmless given acquittals and cumulative evidence

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (testimonial hearsay standard under the Sixth Amendment)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (primary-purpose test for testimonial statements)
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (forensic lab reports held testimonial when created for prosecution)
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (forensic certification testimonial where prepared for use in prosecution)
Burns v. United States, 235 A.3d 758 (D.C. 2020) (autopsy testimonial when performed for an active homicide investigation)
Jackson v. United States, 924 A.2d 1016 (D.C. 2007) (administrative court/booking records non-testimonial when created for routine operations)
Young v. United States, 63 A.3d 1033 (D.C. 2013) (defining testimonial as statements made primarily for evidentiary purposes)
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (harmless-error standard)