Grimes v. State
296 Ga. 337
| Ga. | 2014Background
- January 29, 2011: a group including Slaton, Hicks, Grimes, Reed, Willis, Brantley (and others) engaged in a shooting outside an apartment complex; Marcus Holloway was killed and LaQuinton Forte was assaulted.
- Eyewitness Lancelot Hicks (co-indictee) testified he saw five people (including appellants) shooting; Hicks was treated as an accomplice witness by defense and prosecution.
- Physical evidence: 23 shell casings and a bullet recovered from the victim; ballistics showed at least four, possibly five, different guns were fired; 9mm and .357 firearms recovered linked to some casings.
- Charles Slaton made statements in jail to cellmate Anthony Johnson describing guns used and naming nicknames of shooters; Johnson told police and testified at trial; the State admitted Slaton’s statements under the co‑conspirator exception to hearsay.
- Defendants were tried jointly (Slaton separately). Each appellant was convicted of felony murder (malice murder acquittals), aggravated assault, and firearm possession during a crime; multiple procedural postures on appeals and motions for new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency/corroboration of accomplice Hicks (Grimes, Reed, Brantley) | State: Hicks’s testimony corroborated by extraneous evidence (Johnson’s statements, ballistics, tattoos, other witness placing defendants at scene) | Defendants: Hicks was an accomplice whose testimony lacked independent corroboration tying them to active participation rather than mere presence | Court: Evidence (slight independent corroboration) was sufficient; convictions affirmed (Grimes decision 4–1; dissent argued insufficiency) |
| Admission of Slaton’s jail statements under co‑conspirator hearsay (Reed, Willis, Brantley) | State: Statements made during concealment phase, reliable, admissible against all conspirators | Defendants: Statements not in furtherance of conspiracy or made during concealment; some argued testimonial/Confrontation Clause or lack of reliability | Court: Trial court did not err — conspiracy existed, concealment ongoing, statements admissible; Confrontation Clause not implicated because statements were non‑testimonial |
| Jury asked definition of “slight corroboration” — use of Black’s Law Dictionary definition (Grimes, Reed) | Defendants: Recharge on accomplice testimony or use everyday meaning; B.L.D. definition could lower corroboration standard | State: Definition accurate; trial court’s full accomplice charge considered as whole | Court: No reversible error — definition consistent with law and accomplice instructions read as a whole |
| Challenges to juror impartiality and strikes for cause (Grimes — Jurors 7 & 15; Willis — Juror 7; Brantley — Juror 19 internet exposure) | Defendants: Prospective jurors’ prior victimization or juror’s internet exposure warranted strikes/mistrial | State: Trial court properly exercised discretion; jurors stated they could be impartial; Brantley opposed removing Juror 19 at trial | Held: No manifest abuse of discretion; trial court’s determinations affirmed |
| Ineffective assistance for failing to object to detective’s testimony and Confrontation claims (Reed) | Reed: Counsel should have objected to detective’s testimony and raised Sixth Amendment issue | State: Counsel had continuing objections; Confrontation claim lacked merit because statements were non‑testimonial | Court: No deficient performance; ineffective assistance claim denied |
| Failure to charge lesser included offenses (Willis) | Willis: Court should have instructed on involuntary manslaughter and reckless conduct | State: No evidence of reckless conduct or facts supporting lesser charges | Court: No error — no evidentiary support for lesser‑included instructions |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 750 (733 S.E.2d 300) (corroboration of accomplice testimony may be "slight" and from an extraneous source)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency review)
- Threatt v. State, 293 Ga. 549 (748 S.E.2d 400) (accomplice corroboration must be independent and connect defendant to crime)
- Young v. State, 291 Ga. 627 (732 S.E.2d 269) (accomplice corroboration principles)
- Ottis v. State, 269 Ga. 151 (496 S.E.2d 264) (co‑conspirator statements admissible during concealment phase)
- Lee v. State, 283 Ga. App. 826 (642 S.E.2d 876) (accepting Black's Law Dictionary definition in jury charge context)
- Thompson v. State, 294 Ga. 693 (755 S.E.2d 713) (deference to trial court on juror equivocations)
- Cade v. State, 289 Ga. 805 (716 S.E.2d 196) (juror doubts do not automatically require strike)
- Sanchez v. State, 285 Ga. 749 (684 S.E.2d 251) (issues not raised below are waived on appeal)
- Pruitt v. State, 282 Ga. 30 (644 S.E.2d 837) (Strickland standard and strong presumption of reasonable counsel)
- Gilyard v. State, 288 Ga. 800 (708 S.E.2d 329) (trial counsel not ineffective for failing to make meritless objections)
- Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. 898 (757 S.E.2d 102) (corroboration requirements and accomplice evidence principles)
- Johnson v. State, 288 Ga. 803 (708 S.E.2d 331) (independent corroboration may be slight but must support both identity and participation)
- Williams v. State, 280 Ga. 584 (630 S.E.2d 370) (same corroboration principles)