Grimes v. Gary Community School Corporation
2:13-cv-00036
| N.D. Ind. | Mar 23, 2016Background
- On Jan. 21, 2011, Dara Grimes (family support specialist) attended a change-of-placement meeting at Lew Wallace High School for her client MM, an 18-year-old special-education student. After the meeting two school security officers (also Gary police officers/reserve officers) attempted to arrest MM on an alleged outstanding warrant.
- A confrontation followed in the school security office about whether a prior charge had been dropped as a manifestation of MM’s disability; witnesses’ accounts conflict about who invited Grimes in, who was disruptive, and what was said.
- Grimes was ordered to leave, went into the hallway, and was arrested; she was charged with resisting law enforcement and disorderly conduct and alleges bruising from tight handcuffs. The officers dispute key factual details including who handcuffed her.
- Grimes sued the City of Gary, Gary Community School Corporation (School Corporation), and Officers Goshay and Bradshaw under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, excessive force (Fourth Amendment), First Amendment retaliation, and failure-to-train/municipal liability. All defendants moved for summary judgment.
- The court found genuine disputes of material fact as to false arrest and excessive force against Officers Goshay and Bradshaw, but granted summary judgment for the City of Gary and for the School Corporation on municipal-liability and First Amendment claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Municipal liability — City of Gary (failure to train / control) | City failed to train/oversee officers, proximately causing constitutional violations. | City is distinct from School Corp; officers acted as School Corp employees; no evidence of inadequate city training or control. | Granted for City: City not liable; officers acted as School Corp employees; no training defect shown. |
| Municipal liability — School Corporation (policy/custom/failure to train) | School Corp failed to train officers re: warrantless arrests and school environment, or maintained a custom permitting misconduct. | No evidence of inadequate training or an unconstitutional custom/policy. | Granted for School Corp on all claims except those against officers individually: no evidence of policy/custom or training deficiency tied to violation. |
| First Amendment retaliation | Grimes was exercising protected speech and arrested in retaliation for speaking up. | Arrest resulted from disruptive conduct interfering with officers, not retaliatory animus. | Summary judgment for all defendants on First Amendment claim: no evidence speech was motivating factor. |
| False arrest & Excessive force (officer liability) | Arrest lacked probable cause; force used (pushing, tight handcuffs, bruising) was excessive. | Officers contend Grimes was disruptive/unruly and officers had grounds to arrest and use force. | Denied as to officers: genuine disputes of material fact exist on probable cause and reasonableness of force; these claims proceed to jury. |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires an official policy or custom causing the constitutional violation)
- Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) (First Amendment retaliation requires a showing that protected speech was a motivating factor)
- Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (probable cause assessed by facts and circumstances known to officers at time of arrest)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for summary judgment and when a genuine factual dispute exists)
- Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2003) (excessive-force analysis under the Fourth Amendment: totality of circumstances)
- Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237 (7th Cir. 2012) (elements for First Amendment retaliation claim)