764 S.E.2d 262
Va.2014Background
- Levin Grimes was observed exiting a small exterior door into a crawl space beneath a one-story brick dwelling; he and another man carried copper pipe and were muddy.
- Police found cut lock on the crawl-space door, copper pipe in the crawl space and yard, and tools and copper pipe on Grimes's person.
- Grimes was charged with statutory burglary (Code § 18.2-91) based on breaking and entering the crawl space with intent to steal.
- At trial Grimes argued he did not enter the dwelling because the crawl space had no internal access and was unsuitable for habitation; the circuit court denied his motion to strike and convicted him.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the crawl space was part of the dwelling; the Supreme Court of Virginia granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the crawl space constitutes part of the "dwelling house" for statutory burglary | Commonwealth: Crawl space is within the exterior walls, under same roof, and functionally part of the dwelling, so it is part of the dwelling house | Grimes: Crawl space has no internal access and is not habitable, so it is not part of the dwelling | Held: Crawl space is part of the dwelling house; the court applied ordinary meaning and functional/structural factors |
| Whether evidence was sufficient to sustain statutory burglary conviction | Commonwealth: Evidence of cutting the lock, entering the crawl space, tools and stolen copper pipe supports breaking and entering the dwelling with intent to steal | Grimes: If crawl space is not part of dwelling then burglary elements not met | Held: Because the crawl space is part of the dwelling, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121 (1991) (burglary statutes protect personal safety of habitation)
- Giles v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 369 (2009) (definition of "dwelling house" as a habitation)
- Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296 (2005) (standard for sufficiency-of-evidence review)
- Graybeal v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 736 (1985) (statutory burglary requires proof of dwelling used for habitation)
- Burgett v. State, 314 N.E.2d 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (area functionally interconnected with house is part of dwelling)
- Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 11 S.W. 209 (Ky. 1889) (cellar under house is part of habitation even without internal access)