Griggs v. Oasis Adoption Services, Inc.
241 Ariz. 71
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Thomas and Jennifer Griggs sought certification to adopt a newborn and retained Oasis Adoption Services to perform the statutorily required home-study/certification investigation.
- The Griggses terminated Oasis’s services July 27, 2011 and retained a different agency (Olos) to complete the home study; Oasis then sent an ex parte letter to the juvenile court on July 28 expressing concerns about Thomas Griggs.
- The juvenile court, having received Oasis’s letter (which the Griggses had not seen), ordered the Griggses to appear, vacated their temporary custody of the child, and directed CPS to take custody; the court later ordered Oasis to disclose the letter to the Griggses.
- An evidentiary hearing was held; the court ultimately certified the Griggses as acceptable to adopt on January 31, 2012, but the child had already been placed with another family.
- The Griggses sued Oasis for abuse of process, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; Oasis moved for summary judgment asserting judicial immunity and the superior court granted the motion.
- The court of appeals vacated that summary judgment and remanded, holding Oasis was not entitled to absolute judicial immunity for sending an ex parte letter outside the statutory home-study/report process and without providing the Griggses pre-filing notice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Oasis is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for sending an ex parte letter to the juvenile court after termination of services | Griggs: Oasis’s ex parte letter was actionable and not protected because it was not a statutorily required home-study and deprived them of notice and opportunity to be heard | Oasis: Adoption agencies (and their employees) are entitled to judicial immunity for acts connected to certification investigations and the judicial process | Held: No absolute judicial immunity. The letter was not a §8-105 home-study; Oasis did not act under delegated judicial authority and deprived Griggs of due process protections, so immunity did not apply |
| Whether communications to court that are not formal home-study reports receive the same immunity as statutorily prescribed reports | Griggs: Noncompliant submissions should not be shielded; statutory process and safeguards exist only for formal reports | Oasis: Functional connection to judicial process justifies immunity for communications related to adoption screening | Held: Narrow functional test; only communications that are integral to the judicial process and accompanied by procedural safeguards may be immunized; this letter was outside that scope |
| Whether procedural due process (notice and hearing) affects immunity analysis | Griggs: Lack of pre-filing notice and refusal to provide the letter until court order show absence of safeguards and weigh against immunity | Oasis: Public-policy interest in protecting children supports insulating agency communications | Held: Due process protections are relevant; absence of notice/opportunity to be heard undermines claim of immunity |
| Whether public-policy concerns about child welfare mandate immunity | Griggs: Policy does not justify blanket immunity for off-record, ex parte submissions that harm applicants | Oasis: Protecting child welfare should allow broad immunity for agency communications | Held: Policy does not justify sweeping immunity; immunity must be limited to what is necessary to protect governmental functions |
Key Cases Cited
- Emmett McLoughlin Realty, Inc. v. Pima Cty., 212 Ariz. 351 (App. 2006) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Lavit v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 96 (App. 1992) (limits on absolute immunity for nonjudicial actors)
- Adams v. State, 185 Ariz. 440 (App. 1995) (judicial immunity is a common-law doctrine and must be narrowly applied)
- Burk v. State, 215 Ariz. 6 (App. 2007) (absolute immunity for judicial acts and for court officers performing functions integral to judicial process)
- Acevedo v. Pima Cty. Adult Prob. Dep’t, 142 Ariz. 319 (1984) (probation officers immune for presentence reports but not all probation functions)
- Desilva v. Baker, 208 Ariz. 597 (App. 2004) (limits on immunity for probation-related activities)
- Widoff v. Wiens, 202 Ariz. 383 (App. 2002) (guardian ad litem recommendations presented at hearing considered in immunity analysis)
- Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 (1977) (immunity should be conferred only when necessary)
- Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1985) (due process safeguards relevant to immunity for probation officers)
- Curtis v. Richardson, 212 Ariz. 308 (App. 2006) (due process requires notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard)