Griffin v. Sirva Inc.
15-1307
| 2d Cir. | May 31, 2017Background
- Plaintiffs Trathony Griffin and Michael Godwin were employees of Astro Moving and Storage Co.; Astro terminated them after background checks revealed prior criminal convictions.
- Astro performed work under contract for Allied Van Lines, Inc.; the contract barred individuals with certain criminal convictions from working on Allied jobs.
- Plaintiffs sued Allied and its parent Sirva, Inc., claiming liability under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) § 296(15) (prohibiting denial of employment based on conviction) and § 296(6) (aiding and abetting).
- The district court granted summary judgment to Allied and Sirva, holding § 296(15) applies only to an aggrieved party’s employer and Allied/Sirva were not plaintiffs’ employers.
- The Second Circuit certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals about (1) whether § 296(15) is limited to an employer, (2) how to determine employer status, and (3) whether § 296(6) covers non‑employers who aid or abet violations.
- The New York Court of Appeals: (1) held § 296(15) is limited to an employer; (2) adopted four common‑law factors (selection/engagement, payment, power of dismissal, control) with emphasis on control; and (3) held § 296(6) can impose aiding‑and‑abetting liability on non‑employers, including out‑of‑state entities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 296(15) liability is limited to the aggrieved party’s employer | § 296(15) covers entities that effectively deny employment, not just formal employers | § 296(15) applies only to an employee’s actual employer | Held: § 296(15) is limited to the aggrieved party’s employer (NY Court of Appeals affirmed) |
| How to determine who is an “employer” under § 296(15) | Use functional/common‑law control factors to identify the employer | Employer status should reflect traditional common‑law employer elements | Held: Use four factors—selection/engagement, payment, power of dismissal, control—with greatest emphasis on control (GTE framework) |
| Whether § 296(6) (aiding and abetting) can reach non‑employers | Non‑employers who assist or induce discriminatory denials should be liable under § 296(6) | § 296(6) should be read narrowly and not impose liability on out‑of‑state or non‑employer entities | Held: § 296(6) applies broadly to persons/entities beyond joint employers and can reach out‑of‑state non‑employers who aid/abet § 296(15) violations |
| Effect of New York Court of Appeals answers on district court judgment | Plaintiffs argued the district court’s employer‑only holding and narrow view of aiding/abetting was incorrect and required remand | Defendants argued the district court was correct to enter summary judgment | Held: Second Circuit vacated portions of the district court’s judgment inconsistent with the NY Court of Appeals and remanded for proceedings consistent with that decision |
Key Cases Cited
- Griffin v. Sirva Inc., 835 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 2016) (Second Circuit certified questions to NY Court of Appeals concerning scope of §§ 296(15) and 296(6))
- State Div. of Human Rights v. GTE Corp., 109 A.D.2d 1082 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 1985) (articulated common‑law factors for determining employer status used to interpret § 296(15))