Griffin v. Manchester, NH Parole Office
1:16-cv-00438
D.N.H.Aug 11, 2017Background
- In May 2016, while on parole, Griffin mailed a letter to a county prosecutor (Thorspecken) that included violent and weapons-related language; the prosecutor’s office referred the letter to the FBI as potentially threatening.
- Griffin had been evicted from his halfway-house residence (Helping Hands) on May 10, 2016, and was homeless when parole officers tried to locate him later that month.
- Parole Officer Jennifer Walters swore out an affidavit seeking a warrant charging Griffin with two parole violations: failing to notify his parole officer of a residence change (Parole Rule 3) and failing to be of good conduct due to an “aggressive and threatening” May 2016 letter (Parole Rule 7). Griffin was arrested on June 1, 2016.
- At a June 21, 2016 APB hearing, the board revoked Griffin’s parole, expressly finding the May 2016 letter contained threats and thus constituted bad conduct/new criminal behavior under Parole Rule 7.
- Griffin sued pro se asserting First Amendment retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens against state parole officers, an assistant county attorney, and an FBI agent, alleging the investigation, arrest, and parole revocation were retaliatory.
- The magistrate judge recommended denying Griffin’s motion to strike (challenging defendants’ characterization of the letter as a threat) and recommended granting the State Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, concluding Heck v. Humphrey bars Griffin’s § 1983 First Amendment claims because a favorable judgment would necessarily imply invalidity of the parole revocation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Motion to strike defendants’ characterization of the letter as a threat | Griffin asked court to strike the “threat” defense from defendants’ filing | Defendants argued their First Amendment arguments and references to the letter are pertinent and material | Denied — motion to strike improper; motion papers not a pleading and content was material |
| Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of First Amendment retaliation claims | Griffin contends the May 2016 letter was protected speech and the arrest/revocation were retaliatory | Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, emphasizing the letter’s threatening content | Granted — claims dismissed under Heck because success would invalidate the parole revocation |
| Applicability of Heck v. Humphrey | Griffin seeks damages for retaliatory arrest/revocation based on protected speech | Defendants assert Heck bars suit because a favorable verdict would imply the revocation was invalid | Held applicable — Heck precludes § 1983 claims that would necessarily imply invalidity of parole revocation not previously invalidated |
| Consideration of evidence beyond complaint on 12(b)(6) | Griffin relies on related-case filings and APB records to support his claim | Defendants rely on same records to show parole revocation was based on threatening letter | Court considered incorporated public records/related filings but concluded Heck barred the claims despite those materials |
Key Cases Cited
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (a § 1983 claim that would imply invalidity of conviction or sentence is barred unless that conviction/sentence has been invalidated)
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narc. Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognized a cause of action for damages against federal officers for constitutional violations)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard requires more than conclusions; courts accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true)
- Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed)
- White v. Gittens, 121 F.3d 803 (1st Cir. 1997) (characterized Heck as jurisdictional and applicable where favorable civil judgment would invalidate criminal conviction)