92 Va. Cir. 282
Surry Cir. Ct.2016Background
- Decedent David L. Griffin and Sandra Griffin executed a Property Settlement Agreement at divorce that required David to (1) name the children as primary beneficiaries on life insurance policies (minimum $500,000 while any child <21) and (2) name the children as co‑beneficiaries on 401(k) and similar plans.
- At decedent’s death, plaintiff Gloria Griffin was 19; plaintiffs (the children) allege David failed to maintain or properly designate the life insurance and retirement beneficiary designations as required by the Agreement.
- Plaintiffs allege Defendant Kimberly Cowser‑Griffin (the surviving spouse) received life insurance, retirement, or other benefits that should have gone to the children and seek imposition of a constructive trust / recovery as unjust enrichment.
- Defendant demurred, arguing (1) plaintiffs are not intended third‑party beneficiaries and (2) recovery is barred by Va. Code § 55‑37 (spousal immunity for contractual liability). Defendant sought dismissal in her individual capacity.
- The Agreement was attached to the complaint (making it part of the pleading); the trial court heard oral argument and supplemental submissions before ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing as intended third‑party beneficiaries | Agreement expressly identifies children as beneficiaries; thus they have contractual rights to sue | Children are not intended beneficiaries and therefore lack standing | Court: children are intended third‑party beneficiaries; demurrer denied on this ground |
| Validity of claim against spouse under Va. Code § 55‑37 | Plaintiffs seek recovery from Defendant only to the extent she was unjustly enriched after receiving benefits due to the children | § 55‑37 bars imposing personal liability on a spouse for the other spouse’s contractual obligations | Court: § 55‑37 does not bar unjust enrichment/constructive trust claim; action targets benefits received, not imposition of original contractual liability |
| Sufficiency of pleading to state a cause of action | Pleadings and attached Agreement state facts showing breach and receipt of benefits by Defendant | Pleadings insufficient to state a claim against Defendant individually | Court: Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges facts to state causes of action; demurrer overruled |
| Consideration of contract exhibit on demurrer | Exhibit incorporated by reference may be considered on demurrer | Defendant implicitly argued facts should not be considered beyond complaint text | Court: Under Rule 1:4 and precedent, the attached Agreement is considered with the pleading |
Key Cases Cited
- Tronfeld v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Va. 709 (describing demurrer as testing pleading sufficiency)
- Welding, Inc. v. Bland County Serv. Auth., 261 Va. 218 (same principle on demurrer review)
- Fox v. Custis, 236 Va. 69 (demurrer admits well‑pleaded facts but not legal conclusions)
- Kelly Health Care v. Prudential Ins. Co., 226 Va. 376 (distinguishing intended vs. incidental third‑party beneficiaries)
- Richmond Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Wiley N. Jackson Co., 220 Va. 135 (beneficiary identified in contract is an intended beneficiary)