Griego v. Oliver
2014 NMSC 003
N.M.2013Background
- Six same-gender couples (plaintiffs) challenged New Mexico county clerks’ refusal to issue marriage licenses, seeking recognition of the right to civil marriage and attendant statutory rights and protections.
- County clerks were divided: some began issuing licenses; others refused, prompting multiple district-court rulings and a petition for writ of superintending control to the New Mexico Supreme Court.
- Plaintiffs alleged violations of Article II, § 18 (Equal Protection) and asserted the right to marry and to receive all marital statutory benefits; they sought statewide relief including gender-neutral forms and equal application of marital statutes.
- The State and intervening counties defended limits on marriage as tied to important governmental interests: primarily "responsible procreation and childrearing" and preserving the institution of marriage.
- The Supreme Court analyzed statutory language and history, concluded statutes read together functionally excluded same‑gender marriage, and addressed the constitutional challenge under New Mexico Equal Protection doctrine.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether New Mexico law permits same‑gender civil marriage | Plaintiffs: marriage statutes should be read broadly and gender‑neutrally to allow same‑gender marriage and attendant rights | Clerks/State: statutes (forms, "bride/groom," consanguinity, "husband and wife") indicate legislative intent to limit marriage to opposite‑sex couples | Statutes read as a whole had the effect of precluding same‑gender marriages; constitutional analysis required |
| Whether same‑gender couples are similarly situated to opposite‑sex couples for marriage laws | Plaintiffs: committed same‑gender couples seeking marriage are similarly situated to opposite‑sex couples (commitment, parenting) | Defendants: opposite‑sex couples uniquely capable of procreation; not similarly situated | Court: similarly situated — purpose of marriage laws is stability/order of relationships, not procreation alone |
| Level of scrutiny for classification based on sexual orientation | Plaintiffs: at least intermediate scrutiny; some argued for strict scrutiny as sex‑based | Defendants: not a sensitive/suspect class; political gains show sufficient political power | Court: sexual orientation is a discrete, historically discriminated class with limited political power — apply intermediate scrutiny |
| Whether denying marriage to same‑gender couples is substantially related to important government interests | Plaintiffs: banning same‑gender marriage fails even intermediate scrutiny; harms families and children | Defendants: promotes responsible procreation/child‑rearing and prevents deinstitutionalization of marriage | Court: procreation/child‑rearing/doctrine of tradition are not sufficient or substantially related; law fails intermediate scrutiny — denial violates Equal Protection; remedy: interpret civil marriage to include union of two persons and require gender‑neutral forms and equal application of all marital rights |
Key Cases Cited
- Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating race‑based marriage bans; principle that marriage is a fundamental civil right)
- W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (courts must protect individual constitutional rights from majoritarian votes)
- United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (federal government must recognize lawful marriages for federal benefits; signaled limits on DOMA)
- Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (recognized right to marry as fundamentally important but not immune to reasonable regulation)
- Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (struck down a broad constitutional amendment targeting gays/lesbians; moral disapproval insufficient justification)
- Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch., 138 N.M. 331 (N.M. 2005) (intermediate scrutiny framework for sensitive classes under New Mexico law)
- Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (state law interpreted to prohibit same‑sex marriage; constitutional analysis required)
- Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (applied heightened scrutiny and recognized equal protection violation in barring same‑sex marriage)
- Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (found same‑sex couples similarly situated and applied heightened scrutiny to conclude marriage ban unconstitutional)