Greyfield Resources, Inc. v. Drummer (In Re Drummer)
457 B.R. 912
| Bankr. N.D. Ga. | 2011Background
- Debtor filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy on February 18, 2011; Movant holds a Fulton County tax deed on the Property dated February 2, 2010 and recorded April 8, 2010.
- Tax sale was based on a fieri facias for unpaid 2005 taxes totaling $948.07; Movant bid $11,000 at the sale.
- Property listed by Debtor as fee simple valued at $55,000; Debtor’s Schedule D shows a mortgage lien by HFC for $74,000; Plan proposes $15,000 to Movant as a priority tax claimant.
- Barment Notice (notice to redeem) was served February 21, 2011, three days after filing, with a redemption deadline of April 2, 2011.
- Movant seeks stay relief to foreclose the equity of redemption under Georgia Barment Statutes, asserting ownership of the property.
- Issue presented: whether Barment Statutes and fixed redemption timelines can proceed notwithstanding the automatic stay and the Debtor’s estate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debtor’s interest subject to Barment Statutes | Movant contends it owns the property free of Debtor’s redemption rights. | Debtor’s right to redeem is property of the estate and delays relief. | Debtor’s redemption right is property of the estate; Movant’s interest is defeasible until redemption ends. |
| Effect of Barment Notice served post-petition | Barment notice could be valid if properly served post-petition. | Service after petition violates § 362(a); reservice would be required if stay lifted. | Barment Notice service after bankruptcy filing is void under § 362(a); reservice would be needed if stay lifted. |
| Relief from stay under § 362(d) | Movant is adequately protected and should be allowed to proceed to protect its interest. | Property necessary to reorganization; Debtor may confirm plan; no lack of adequate protection. | Relief from stay denied for now; Movant adequately protected and property remains necessary to reorganization. |
| Time limits for redemption under Barment Statutes | Redemption not possible within 60 days post-petition; four-year ripening end date looming. | Bankruptcy stay may toll or extend redemption deadlines under § 108(b). | Four-year ripening date is April 8, 2014; § 108(b) does not extend beyond that date; stay denial preserves option to renew later. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commercial Fed. Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 85 F.3d 1555 (11th Cir. 1996) (estate rights of the debtor to redeem; Canney and Canney-related authority)
- In re Canney, 284 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2002) (automatic stay does not toll state statutory redemption periods)
- In re Connors, 497 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2007) (section 108(b) governs debtor redemption period, not § 362)
- Johnson v. First Nat’l Bank of Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1983) (debtors may have extended periods under state time limits after petition)
- In re Milne, 185 B.R. 277 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (statutory time limits and extension considerations)
- Hand, 52 B.R. 65 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (timing considerations in redemption and bankruptcy context)
- Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P. v. Harpagon Co., LLC., 277 Ga. 41 (Ga. 2003) (Barment-type interests and timing under Georgia law)
- BX Corp. v. Hickory Hill 1185, LLC, 285 Ga. 5 (Ga. 2009) (Barment and redemption rights with state-law framework)
