Gretna Racing, LLC v. Florida Department of Business And Professional Regulation, etc.
225 So. 3d 759
| Fla. | 2017Background
- Florida voters in 2004 authorized countywide referenda for slots only in Miami‑Dade and Broward under art. X, § 23; Legislature was directed to implement enabling statutes.
- Chapter 551 authorizes the Division to issue slot licenses to “eligible facilities,” with § 551.104(2) conditioning approval on a countywide voter referendum “as specified in s. 23, Art. X,” which on its face applies to only Miami‑Dade and Broward.
- § 551.102(4) defines “eligible facility” in three clauses: (1) implements art. X, § 23; (2) grants eligibility for facilities in certain charter counties (no referendum requirement); and (3) contemplates eligibility in “any other county” that has approved slots by a countywide referendum held pursuant to a “statutory or constitutional authorization after the effective date” of that clause.
- Gadsden County held a countywide vote approving slots; Gretna Racing sought a Division slot license but the Division denied it, concluding (a) § 551.104(2) limits referenda to Miami‑Dade/Broward and (b) Gadsden’s referendum lacked the required post‑effective‑date “statutory or constitutional authorization.”
- The First DCA affirmed the Division and certified a question of great public importance. The Florida Supreme Court granted review and held the Gadsden referendum was not authorized; therefore Gretna was not an eligible facility and the Division correctly denied the license.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a non‑charter county’s general home‑rule powers authorize a countywide binding referendum approving slots so as to satisfy § 551.102(4)(3) | Gretna: general home‑rule power (art. VIII § 1(f) and § 125.01) suffices as the “statutory or constitutional authorization” required by clause 3 | Division: clause 3 requires a specific statutory or constitutional authorization enacted after the clause’s effective date; general home‑rule authority is insufficient | No. General home‑rule power does not authorize a binding slots referendum; the Gadsden vote was not an authorized referendum and cannot create eligibility |
| Whether § 551.104(2)’s referendum limitation (ties to art. X, § 23) was impliedly repealed by later amendments to § 551.102(4) | Gretna: later amendments expanded eligibility and effectively superseded the § 551.104(2) limitation | Division: no repeal; § 551.104(2) still limits issuance to counties authorized under art. X § 23 unless a separate authorization exists | No repeal. § 551.104(2) remains limiting and clause 3 does not self‑execute an authorization |
| Whether the Gadsden vote qualified as a referendum “held pursuant to a statutory or constitutional authorization after the effective date” of clause 3 | Gretna: county conduct of the straw ballot/other statutes/create authorization; county home‑rule power supplies authorization | Division: Gadsden’s authorization predated clause 3 or is absent; straw ballot statute insufficient; home‑rule does not create required authorization | No. The referendum lacked the required statutory/constitutional authorization and so cannot confer eligibility |
| Whether counties may independently initiate voter approval to override general criminal prohibition on slot machines | Gretna: county referendum can effect the change required for eligibility | Division: only Legislature/Constitution can authorize such referenda; counties cannot independently authorize conduct that contradicts general law | No. Counties cannot unilaterally authorize binding referenda that would displace general prohibitions without specific statutory/constitutional authorization |
Key Cases Cited
- Speer v. Olson, 367 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1978) (upholding county bond election where statutory and constitutional provisions specifically authorized election procedure)
- Watt v. Firestone, 491 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (counties’ home‑rule powers do not alone create authority to implement a constitutional amendment’s referendum mechanism; counties implement referenda when the constitution/statute authorize them)
- Gretna Racing, LLC v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Reg., 178 So. 3d 15 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (first‑level appellate decision affirming Division denial and certifying question of great public importance)