Grethen v. Robinson
294 Va. 392
| Va. | 2017Background
- Mark A. Grethen, a Virginia DOC inmate and frequent litigator, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in Chesapeake Circuit Court complaining of limited computer access, an inadequate legal database, and denial of photocopy services. He sought to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under Va. Code § 8.01-691 and submitted an affidavit attesting lack of funds.
- Grethen attached DOC-issued inmate trust account records for the prior 12 months showing “total deposits” and immediate “total withdrawals,” zero month-end balances, and an average monthly balance of $0.00.
- DOC operating procedures classify charges for legal postage, legal photocopies, and medical co-pays as “loans” and, in its accounting, label those internal credits/debits as “deposits” and subsequent withdrawals to repay the loans.
- The circuit court denied Grethen IFP status, concluding the account reflected deposits in the relevant six-month period; it ordered payment of filing and service fees or dismissal without prejudice.
- The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed whether the DOC’s accounting entries labeled as “deposits” constitute “deposits” under Code § 8.01-691 and whether Grethen was therefore entitled to IFP status.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DOC’s accounting entries labeled as “deposits” count as “deposits” under Va. Code § 8.01-691 | Grethen: DOC’s labeled “deposits” are not real deposits of funds available to him; they’re accounting entries for debts (loans) and leave no usable balance | DOC: The loans/expenses it paid on Grethen’s behalf were actual expenditures/deposits into his trust account and thus constitute deposits within § 8.01-691 | The Court: These entries are not “deposits” in the ordinary meaning; they are accounting devices for services provided and do not show available funds, so they do not bar IFP status |
| Whether the trial court properly denied IFP under § 8.01-691 when trust statements showed such entries in the prior six months | Grethen: Because there were no actual deposits available in the prior six months, he meets the statutory trigger for mandatory IFP | DOC: Presence of those entries means deposits occurred in the six-month period, permitting the court to deny IFP | Held: Trial court erred; Grethen should have been permitted to proceed IFP under § 8.01-691’s six-month no-deposits rule |
| Statutory construction standard to apply | N/A (parties relied on ordinary meaning) | N/A | The Court applies plain-meaning construction and dictionary definitions to interpret “deposit” de novo |
| Whether policy/administrative accounting practices can override the statute’s plain meaning | Grethen: Administrative labels shouldn’t defeat the statute’s purpose of protecting indigent inmates | DOC: Its accounting reflects actual expenditures and thus should control | The Court: Administrative labeling does not change the ordinary meaning of “deposit”; statute protects inmates from being forced to choose between medical care and litigation |
Key Cases Cited
- Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96 (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
- Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456 (statutory construction preferring plain meaning)
- Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232 (legislature as author of public policy; cited in dissent)
- In re Woodley, 290 Va. 482 (legislative policy attribution; cited in dissent)