Gressman v. State
2013 UT 63
Utah2013Background
- In 1993 Jed Gressman was convicted of aggravated sexual assault; DNA testing at trial could not exclude him. He served ~39 months.
- In 1996 the district court granted a joint motion to vacate his conviction and ordered a new trial based on newly discovered, more-advanced DNA showing the semen did not come from Gressman; the State declined to retry.
- In 2009 Gressman sued under Utah’s Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) seeking a judicial determination of factual innocence and statutory financial assistance; he died during the litigation.
- Counsel substituted Gressman’s widow as plaintiff; the district court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, treated the 1996 vacatur as dispositive of factual innocence, granted summary judgment for the widow, and awarded statutory assistance with prejudgment interest.
- The State appealed, arguing (1) the PCRA claims abated on death, (2) vacatur does not conclusively establish factual innocence under the PCRA, and (3) prejudgment interest is not authorized.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do Gressman’s PCRA claims survive his death / may widow be substituted? | Gressman’s claim survives; Utah survival statute preserves personal-injury–type statutory claims and widow may be substituted. | Claims abated at common law and PCRA did not expressly preserve survivability pre-2012; suit should have extinguished on death. | Survived: court held Utah’s survival statute (personal-injury language) preserved the statutory factual-innocence claim and substitution was proper. |
| Which version of PCRA governs survivability (2008 vs 2012 amendments)? | Preamendment (2008) governs because 2012 amendments are substantive and nonretroactive. | 2012 amendments clarified survivability and thus apply to pending cases. | 2008 version applies; 2012 survivability rules are nonretroactive. |
| Does the 1996 vacatur collaterally estop the State and conclusively establish PCRA factual innocence? | Vacatur established innocence; collateral estoppel precludes relitigation. | Vacatur (new-trial grant based on newly discovered evidence) used a different, lesser standard and did not meet PCRA’s clear-and-convincing factual-innocence standard. | Vacatur is not dispositive; district court erred to treat vacatur as conclusive on PCRA factual innocence. |
| May prejudgment interest be awarded on PCRA statutory assistance payments (2008 PCRA)? | Widow argued interest should be allowed. | State argued statute fixes the statutory payment as full compensation; prejudgment interest is impermissible. | Court held under the controlling pre-2012 PCRA prejudgment interest is not authorized; statutory award is full compensation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Vorher v. Henriod, 297 P.3d 614 (Utah 2013) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 232 P.3d 1059 (Utah 2010) (summary judgment standard)
- Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842 (Utah 2004) (res judicata / claim and issue preclusion framework)
- Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 285 P.3d 1157 (Utah 2012) (elements for issue preclusion)
- Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (U.S. 1985) (characterizing §1983 claims as personal-injury–type actions for statute-of-limitations analysis)
- Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11 (Utah 1990) (distinguishing substantive vs. procedural changes for retroactivity analysis)