Gressman v. State
323 P.3d 998
Utah2013Background
- Jed Gressman was convicted in 1993 (aggravated sexual assault), served ~39 months, and in 1996 the district court vacated his conviction and granted a new trial after advanced DNA excluded him; the State declined to retry.
- In 2009 Gressman filed a petition under Utah’s Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) seeking a factual-innocence determination and statutory financial assistance; he died while the suit was pending and his widow was substituted as plaintiff.
- The district court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, granted substituted-plaintiff status, and awarded summary judgment to Gressman’s widow, treating the 1996 vacatur as dispositive proof of factual innocence and awarding PCRA payments plus prejudgment interest.
- The State appealed, arguing (1) the PCRA claims abated on death, (2) the 1996 vacatur did not establish factual innocence under the PCRA standard, and (3) prejudgment interest was improper.
- The Utah Supreme Court held: the PCRA claim survived Gressman’s death under Utah’s general survival statute; the 1996 vacatur did not collaterally estop relitigation of PCRA factual innocence (so summary judgment was improper); and prejudgment interest is not allowed under the relevant pre-amendment PCRA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do PCRA factual-innocence claims survive petitioner’s death? | Gressman’s widow: surviving under PCRA or general survival statute; substitution appropriate. | State: claim abated on death (common-law rule); 2012 PCRA amendments (or abatement) apply. | The pre-amendment PCRA did not address survivability but Utah’s general survival statute saves causes "arising out of personal injury to a person," so the claim survived and substitution was proper. |
| Which version of the PCRA governs survivability and remedies? | Widow: earlier (2008) law applies to pending claims. | State: invoke 2012 amendments (non-retroactive?) to limit survivability/ payments. | The court applied the law in effect when the cause arose (2008); 2012 amendments were not retroactive and substantive. |
| Did the 1996 vacatur conclusively establish factual innocence under the PCRA (collateral estoppel)? | Widow: vacatur shows the conviction was invalid and establishes innocence. | State: vacatur (new trial granted for newly discovered evidence) applied a different standard than PCRA factual-innocence; therefore not preclusive. | The vacatur used a different, lesser standard (likelihood of different result) and did not satisfy PCRA’s clear-and-convincing burden; collateral estoppel does not apply—summary judgment was erroneous. |
| May the district court award prejudgment interest on PCRA assistance payments? | Widow: interest appropriate. | State: PCRA fixes payment amount; no statutory authorization for prejudgment interest. | Under the pre-amendment PCRA the statute fixes the compensation and states payments are full resolution of claims; prejudgment interest may not be awarded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Vorher v. Henriod, 297 P.3d 614 (Utah 2013) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 232 P.3d 1059 (Utah 2010) (summary judgment reviewed for correctness)
- Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 285 P.3d 1157 (Utah 2012) (issue-preclusion elements)
- Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (U.S. 1985) (§ 1983 actions treated as personal-injury for limitations/analog purposes)
- Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907) (precluded prejudgment interest where statute fixes damages)