Greiman v. Hodges
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5263
| S.D. Iowa | 2015Background
- In 1982 Greiman was convicted of first-degree kidnapping at age 16 and sentenced under then-mandatory law to life without parole; post-Graham the sentence was vacated and converted to life with parole eligibility.
- After resentencing (2012) Greiman was immediately parole-eligible but the Iowa Board of Parole (IBOP) denied parole twice, citing only the seriousness of the offense.
- Greiman alleges the IBOP did not consider his youth at the time of the offense or evidence of maturity/rehabilitation as required by Graham and related precedent.
- Greiman also alleges an IDOC policy bars him from sex-offender treatment (a prerequisite for parole consideration) because he lacks a defined discharge date, effectively preventing parole.
- He sued state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment) and the Fourteenth Amendment (due process); defendants removed the case and moved to dismiss.
- The district court denied the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, finding Greiman plausibly alleged that IBOP/IDOC policies deprived him of the constitutionally required "meaningful opportunity" for release.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Graham requires parole-review consideration of youth/maturation | Greiman: Graham entitles juvenile nonhomicide offenders to a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity, so IBOP must consider youth and rehabilitation at parole review | IBOP: Graham governs sentencing only; no entitlement to enhanced or special parole review beyond ordinary procedures | Court: Denied dismissal — alleged facts plausibly show IBOP failed to provide the Graham-required meaningful opportunity at parole review |
| Whether denying sex-offender treatment that is a parole prerequisite violates Eighth Amendment | Greiman: IDOC policy barring treatment (due to no discharge date) functionally forecloses parole and creates a de facto life-without-parole in violation of Graham | IDOC: Inmates have no constitutional right to specific programs/treatment; lack of program access is not per se unconstitutional | Court: Denied dismissal — plausible claim that the policy results in a de facto life-without-parole and triggers Graham/Eighth Amendment protection |
| Whether Greiman has a due-process liberty interest in the Graham-guaranteed opportunity | Greiman: Graham creates a substantive entitlement to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation and obtain release; denial is a deprivation requiring process | Defendants: No protected liberty interest in parole; Greenholtz means only a hope of parole exists, so no due-process claim | Court: Denied dismissal — Graham is more than mere hope; allegations plausibly show denial of process to which he is due |
| Whether the claims are amenable to dismissal at pleading stage (novelty) | Greiman: Novel constitutional application of Graham to parole procedures and policies warrants discovery | Defendants: Standard parole rules suffice; no special relief warranted | Court: Declined to dismiss novel claims at pleading stage and allowed discovery and merits resolution |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment forbids life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders; states must provide a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juveniles differ from adults in culpability and capacity for change; death penalty unconstitutional for crimes committed under age 18)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencer must consider youth and attendant characteristics)
- Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding that a mere hope of parole is not a protected liberty interest under due process)
- Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697 (Iowa 2010) (Iowa Supreme Court applied Graham to invalidate mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide)
- State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013) (Iowa requires individualized sentencing analysis like Miller for de facto life or very long term-of-years sentences for juveniles)
- State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014) (Iowa held mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles unconstitutional under state cruel-and-unusual clause)
- West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (§ 1983 elements: violation of federal right by someone acting under color of state law)