GREGORY PHELPS v. MISSOURI STATE TREASURER AS CUSTODIAN OF THE SECOND INJURY FUND
SD36998
| Mo. Ct. App. | Jun 25, 2021Background:
- Gregory Phelps (Claimant) sustained a compensable left-shoulder work injury on April 14, 2016 (primary injury); the Commission found him permanently and totally disabled but denied Second Injury Fund (Fund) PTD benefits.
- Phelps asserted preexisting disabilities to his pulmonary system (childhood asthma; 2000 chemical exposure at work), right knee (1976 injury; 1998/1999 events; compensable 2009 reinjury with surgery and a 4% right-leg rating; settled for 15% of the right leg), and low back (2007 injury; compensable 2015 reinjury with conservative care, 2% whole-person rating; settled 11.4% whole person).
- The ALJ found only the 2009 right-knee injury and the 2015 low-back injury were direct results of compensable injuries as defined in §287.020, but each produced less than the 50-week PPD threshold required by §287.220.3(2)(a)a to qualify as a preexisting disability.
- The ALJ therefore concluded Claimant failed the first condition for Fund liability (no qualifying preexisting disability) and denied PTD benefits; the Commission affirmed and added that Claimant also failed to show a single qualifying preexisting disability combined with the primary injury to cause PTD.
- Phelps appealed, arguing the Commission (1) improperly required a prior workers’‑comp claim/award to find a compensable preexisting injury, (2) misapplied §287.220.3 by refusing to aggregate disability weeks across events/recurrences, (3) misapplied the “opposite extremity” rule to treat his left shoulder as opposite the right knee, and (4) erred on the required combination analysis under the second condition.
- The Court reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence, and affirmed the Commission in all respects (mooting the fourth point after rejecting the qualifying-preexisting-disability arguments).
Issues:
| Issue | Phelps' Argument | Treasurer (Fund) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Commission required a prior WC claim/award to treat a prior injury as a compensable injury under §287.220.3(2)(a)a(ii) | Commission effectively imposed an extra requirement—must have filed a claim and received an award | Filing/award evidence is relevant but not a legal prerequisite; claimant still bears burden to prove compensability by substantial evidence | Denied: Commission did not increase claimant's burden; filing/award is relevant evidence but not mandatory proof |
| Whether preexisting-disability analysis may aggregate PPD weeks across multiple events/recurrences (Claimant’s sequential three-step aggregation) | §287.220.3 requires totaling weeks per body part/area across events so any part-causation by a compensable injury would make the whole preexisting disability qualify | Parker and statute require a particular preexisting disability to be medically documented, equal ≥50 weeks, and be a direct result of a compensable injury; claimant must show each requirement for the same preexisting disability | Denied: Court followed Parker—each qualifying preexisting disability must independently meet all requirements; aggregation across distinct injuries/events is not permitted |
| Whether the left shoulder (primary injury) is an "opposite extremity" to the right knee under §287.220.3(2)(a)a(iv) | Opposite extremity means opposite side of body; left shoulder (arm) is opposite side to right knee (leg) so fourth criteria should apply | "Opposite extremity" means the corresponding member of the paired extremities (left leg is opposite right leg); shoulder is not the opposite extremity of a knee | Denied: "The opposite extremity" refers to the paired extremity (right leg ↔ left leg); shoulder/arm is not opposite a leg, so §287.220.3(2)(a)a(iv) does not apply |
| Whether Claimant showed combination of a qualifying preexisting disability and the primary injury causing PTD under §287.220.3(2)(a)b | Combination requirement was improperly applied; Claimant argues a single qualifying preexisting existed and combined with the shoulder injury to cause PTD | Second-condition analysis is irrelevant unless first-condition (a qualifying preexisting disability) is satisfied; Claimant did not prove any qualifying preexisting disability | Denied / Moot: Because no qualifying preexisting disability was proved, the second-condition combination analysis need not be reached |
Key Cases Cited
- Cosby v. Treasurer of State, 579 S.W.3d 202 (Mo. banc 2019) (statutory interpretation principles; plain-meaning inquiry)
- Johme v. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504 (Mo. banc 2012) (claimant bears burden to prove compensability)
- Annayeva v. SAB of TSD of City of St. Louis, 597 S.W.3d 196 (Mo. banc 2020) (distinguishing burden of production and persuasion)
- Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 488 S.W.3d 62 (Mo. banc 2016) (clarifying burden concepts)
- Seifner v. Treasurer of State—Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 362 S.W.3d 59 (Mo. App. 2012) (Fund has no burden to produce contrary evidence)
- Naeter v. Treasurer of Missouri, 576 S.W.3d 233 (Mo. App. 2019) (court may not add or subtract words from a statute)
- Macon County Emergency Servs. Bd. v. Macon County Comm’n, 485 S.W.3d 353 (Mo. banc 2016) (statutory construction limits)