Gregory Meyer, V. King County
81858-9
| Wash. Ct. App. | Jul 19, 2021Background
- Meyer, a King County FMD security officer since 2003, filed a 2014 occupational safety/health discrimination complaint; an administrative claim for retaliation and disability discrimination followed in 2015.
- Parties mediated but did not resolve claims; they then negotiated a settlement by email in 2016. Meyer sought a positive reference and confirmation he would be eligible for rehire.
- County counsel told Meyer’s attorney the County would not rehire Meyer regardless and would only provide limited reference information; Meyer accepted the County’s terms.
- The April 1, 2016 settlement provided $100,000, three months paid administrative leave, resignation, a broad release of employment-related claims, and a reference protocol stating the County would not provide additional information about rehire eligibility.
- After resigning, Meyer applied 22 times to County jobs (2016–2019); HR staff did not process his FMD applications per the interim director’s instruction that Meyer was ineligible for rehire.
- Meyer sued for retaliation and disability discrimination in August 2019; the trial court granted summary judgment for King County based on the settlement agreement, and Meyer appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the settlement agreement barred Meyer’s retaliation and disability claims | Meyer: agreement does not explicitly state he is ineligible for rehire, so it does not bar his claims | County: agreement was intended to resolve "any and all issues related to Meyer’s employment" and the parties understood Meyer would not be rehired | Court: Affirmed—agreement and negotiation context show parties intended Meyer not to be eligible for rehire; claims barred |
| Whether extrinsic evidence (emails) may be considered in interpreting the agreement | Meyer: court’s reliance on emails shows the agreement was ambiguous; he challenges consideration | County: courts may consider surrounding context and negotiations to determine intent even if terms appear clear | Court: Allowed consideration of extrinsic evidence under the context rule; use of emails was proper to determine parties’ intent |
| Entitlement to attorney fees on appeal | Meyer: sought fees under RAP 18.1 and RCW 49.60.030(2) | County: Meyer is not the prevailing party | Court: Denied fees—Meyer not prevailing party |
Key Cases Cited
- Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp., 192 Wn.2d 403 (de novo review of summary judgment)
- Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658 (summary judgment standard and view of evidence for nonmoving party)
- Condon v. Condon, 177 Wn.2d 150 (settlement agreements governed by contract law)
- Scott Galvanizing, Inc. v. Nw. EnviroServices, Inc., 120 Wn.2d 573 (contract interpretation focuses on parties’ intent)
- Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493 (objective manifestations control; consider contract context)
- Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wn.2d 657 (contract interpretation considers surrounding circumstances and subsequent conduct)
- Pitell v. King County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 4 Wn. App. 2d 764 (extrinsic evidence may be considered even without ambiguity)
- Kelley v. Tonda, 198 Wn. App. 303 (limits on extrinsic evidence that varies or contradicts written terms)
- Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Shulman, 84 Wn.2d 433 (courts will not rewrite clear, unambiguous agreements)