Gregory L. Brown v. W. Muniz
889 F.3d 661
9th Cir.2018Background
- Gregory Brown was convicted (aiding and abetting conspiracy and attempted murder) for the 1995 shooting of Robin Williams and sentenced to 56 years-to-life; co-defendants were also convicted.
- At trial, prosecution evidence and witness testimony (including the victim, Williams) supported conviction; defense presented impeachment and alternative-suspect evidence but no forensic link to Brown.
- Brown filed a federal habeas petition after state-court appeals; it was denied and courts refused a COA, so his first federal habeas was resolved on the merits.
- Years later (2010–2011) the San Francisco DA disclosed personnel-file information for three officers (Hockett, Hutchings, Gin) that the DA indicated "may be subject to disclosure under Brady." Some material implicated officer misconduct or arrests years earlier; Gin had testified at trial.
- Brown filed a second-in-time § 2254 habeas asserting these were Brady/Giglio materials. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as a second or successive petition; Brown appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a second-in-time federal habeas petition alleging Brady violations is “second or successive” under AEDPA | Brown: Brady claims are not second or successive if petitioner lacked knowledge of the evidence at time of first petition; petition ripens when petitioner learns of evidence | State: Brady claims ripen when the constitutional violation (failure to disclose) occurred—i.e., pretrial—so they are second or successive if based on facts existing at time of initial petition | The court held Brady claims are generally second or successive if the factual predicate existed when the first petition was filed; §2244(b) applies |
| Whether Brown can obtain authorization to file the second-in-time petition under §2244(b)(2)(B) (due-diligence and actual-innocence gateway) | Brown: He could not have discovered the officer-material earlier; the material is impeaching and would have undermined the prosecution’s weak case | State: The disclosed officer information is tangential, non-material, and would not establish actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence | The court agreed Brown satisfied due-diligence but rejected the actual-innocence showing; Brown failed to make the §2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) prima facie demonstration |
| When does the factual predicate for a Brady claim "accrue" for AEDPA second-or-successive purposes? | Brown: Accrual should be when petitioner learns of the evidence (notice-based) | State: Accrual occurs when the constitutional violation occurred—i.e., when the prosecutor failed to disclose before trial | The court held accrual occurs when the constitutional violation occurred (before trial), not when the petitioner later learns of it |
| Whether Panetti/Magwood unripe-claim exceptions apply to Brady claims discovered after the first petition | Brown: Analogizes to Panetti/Magwood—lack of earlier opportunity to raise claim means it should not be treated as successive | State: Panetti exception is narrow (unripe claims that did not yet exist) and does not cover Brady claims whose predicate existed at trial | Court held Panetti’s unripe-claim exception does not extend to Brady claims whose factual predicate existed at trial; Panetti limited to claims not yet ripe at first filing |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (established prosecution duty to disclose exculpatory/impeachment evidence)
- Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (unripe Ford incompetency claims are not "second or successive")
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (second-or-successive analysis focuses on same-judgment challenges and ripeness/full-fair-opportunity principles)
- Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (AEDPA limits on second habeas petitions consistent with Suspension Clause)
- Buenrostro v. United States, 638 F.3d 720 (9th Cir.) (claims ripe at first petition but discovered later are subject to §2244/§2255 gatekeeping)
- Gage v. Chappell, 793 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.) (Brady claim whose predicate existed at or before first petition is second or successive)
- Lopez v. Ryan, 577 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.) (treated a later Brady claim as second or successive; declined to decide whether materiality affects gatekeeping)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (Brady materiality standard: reasonable probability of a different result)
- Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885 (reaffirmed Brady/Strickler materiality standard)