Gregory Kirk v. State of Indiana
974 N.E.2d 1059
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2012Background
- Gregory Kirk was convicted by jury of conspiracy to deal cocaine (Class B), conspiracy to deal a controlled substance (Class B), neglect of a dependent (Class C), and possession of marijuana (Class A).
- D.K., Kirk’s sixteen-year-old stepson, was involved in drug dealing with Barnett, with Kirk often present or coordinating deals.
- Police encountered Kirk and D.K. after a June 19, 2010 incident involving a threat with a gun; D.K. had a loaded stolen handgun, cocaine, and pills on arrest.
- A search incident to arrest yielded a cell phone, and officers examined text messages suggesting drug transactions.
- A search warrant for the home at 918 North Tuxedo Street was issued based on an affidavit describing a conspiracy and observations from the stop and statements by D.K., leading to seizure of numerous drug paraphernalia and weapons.
- Kirk moved to suppress D.K.’s statements, cell-phone content, and home-search evidence; the trial court denied those motions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of D.K.’s statements | Kirk argues admission violated Indiana Code 31-32-5-1 and hearsay rules. | State maintains statements were properly admitted and, where contested, harmless. | Admissible; not abuse of discretion for D.K.’s statements. |
| Warrantless cell phone search | Kirk contends the search violated Fourth Amendment/Article I‑11 and lacked a valid exception. | State argues search incident to arrest permitted the inspection of the phone and texts. | Unreasonable under Article I‑11; error in admitting texts; not harmless for conspiracy in the two-count issue. |
| Probable cause for home search | Kirk asserts warrant was based on tainted evidence (D.K.’s statements and texts). | State contends totality of affidavit supported probable cause. | Probable cause supported; warrant valid despite some tainted content. |
| Admission of the search warrant at trial | Warrant documents were prejudicial and should not have been admitted to the jury. | Warrant was admitted only for the limited purpose of proving authority to enter; not to prejudice the jury. | No abuse; proper limited admissibility of the warrant. |
| Sufficiency of conspiracy evidence | Evidence supports conspiracy to deal cocaine and the drug-conspiracy count beyond a reasonable doubt. | Evidence of agreement to deal controlled substances is insufficient absent proper admission. | Conspiracy to deal cocaine affirmed; conspiracy to deal a controlled substance reversed; other convictions affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- P.M. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (juvenile waiver safeguards against self-incrimination; Miranda context)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (S. Ct. 1966) (establishes safeguards for custodial interrogation)
- United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (S. Ct. 2004) (mere failure to give warnings does not per se violate rights)
- Gutierrez v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (evidentiary standard for admissibility of evidence)
- D.M. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. 2011) (self-incrimination and suppression considerations)
- Smith v. State, 713 N.E.2d 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (harmless error standard for improperly admitted evidence)
- State v. Lucas, 859 N.E.2d 1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (cell-phone search considerations; reasonableness of searches)