Gregory Dickens v. Charles L. Ryan
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1248
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- In Sept. 1991 Gregory Dickens drove a teenage confederate (Travis Amaral) to a Yuma rest area, helped plan an armed robbery, observed Amaral approach victims across the highway, and either furnished or knew Amaral had a .38 revolver used in the crimes.
- Amaral robbed and then shot Bryan and Laura Bernstein; both later died. Dickens picked up Amaral after the shootings, helped dispose of wallets/travelers checks, and did not summon aid or report the crime.
- Dickens was convicted of felony murder (and related offenses), sentenced to death on felony-murder counts, and state postconviction relief was denied; Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the capital sentence.
- Dickens filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition raising (a) Enmund/Tison Eighth Amendment challenge to death eligibility; and (b) ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) at sentencing including newly alleged Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS)/organic brain damage evidence.
- The district court denied relief (finding the IAC claims procedurally defaulted); Ninth Circuit affirmed the Enmund/Tison rejection but vacated the IAC procedural-default ruling and remanded for Martinez analysis (whether ineffective PCR counsel can excuse default).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dickens) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Arizona Supreme Court unreasonably applied Enmund/Tison such that death sentence is unconstitutional | Dickens: his role was like Enmund (mere getaway driver); not a "major participant" and lacked requisite reckless indifference | State: Dickens actively planned, armed/transported Amaral, observed shootings, aided escape and destroyed evidence — like Tison defendants | Court: affirmed — Arizona did not unreasonably apply Enmund/Tison; Dickens was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference |
| Whether Arizona court’s factual findings were unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2) | Dickens: Amaral not credible; state findings (e.g., that Dickens knew Amaral’s propensities or failed to render aid) were unsupported | State: record (Dickens admissions, Amaral testimony, prior knowledge from Oak Grove) supports findings; credibility/deference to state factfinder | Court: affirmed — no unreasonable factual determinations; deference to state court and jury credibility findings applies |
| Whether Dickens’s enhanced IAC sentencing claim (new FAS/brain-damage evidence) was exhausted or procedurally defaulted | Dickens: new mitigation evidence shows trial counsel ineffective; procedural default excused under Martinez because PCR counsel was ineffective | State: new factual allegations were not presented to state courts and thus are defaulted/unexhausted; Martinez inapplicable | Court: Dickens defaulted the new IAC claim, but remanded for district court to apply Martinez to determine whether ineffective PCR counsel establishes cause and prejudice to excuse the default |
| Whether Pinholster or § 2254(e)(2) bar consideration of new evidence on remand | State: Pinholster and AEDPA bar consideration of evidence not presented to state court | Dickens: Martinez allows consideration for the limited purpose of proving cause/prejudice; § 2254(e)(2) does not bar an evidentiary hearing to show cause under Martinez | Court: Pinholster does not bar Martinez-based inquiry here (claim was not adjudicated on the merits in state court); § 2254(e)(2) does not prevent a limited evidentiary hearing to determine cause/prejudice under Martinez |
Key Cases Cited
- Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty unconstitutional for accomplice who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend death)
- Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (death-eligibility for accomplices requires major participation plus reckless indifference to human life)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (ineffective assistance in initial-review collateral proceedings can establish cause to excuse procedural default of trial IAC claims)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (AEDPA §2254(d) review limited to state-court record for claims adjudicated on the merits)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference requires objectively unreasonable application of clearly established law)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance and prejudice)