14 F.4th 898
9th Cir.2021Background
- In 1989 Gregory Demetrulias stabbed and killed Robert Miller and shortly after brutally assaulted Clarence Wissel; he was convicted of first-degree murder and a robbery special circumstance, and sentenced to death.
- At trial Demetrulias testified he went to Miller’s room to collect a $40 debt and acted in self-defense; prosecution presented evidence of robbery and both victims’ nonviolent character.
- Defense requested (1) a claim-of-right instruction (reclaiming property negates robbery intent) and (2) a heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter instruction; both were denied.
- At penalty phase lead counsel Karla Sandrin declined to present extensive mental-health and organic-brain-damage mitigation after investigating conflicting expert reports and fearing harmful rebuttal and discovery; counsel presented other mitigation witnesses instead.
- State courts rejected Demetrulias’s direct and habeas claims; the federal district court denied his habeas petition under AEDPA and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Demetrulias) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of victim-character evidence | Trial court abused discretion and violated due process by admitting brief testimony about victims’ nonviolent character, undermining self-defense | Testimony was brief, non-inflammatory, and probative to rebut self-defense; no due process violation | No due process violation: admission not so prejudicial as to render trial fundamentally unfair |
| Refusal to give claim-of-right instruction | Jury should have been instructed that belief in right to reclaim property negates robbery intent, negating robbery special circumstance | Jury received instructions on specific intent to steal; any omission was harmless because jury rejected defense testimony | Any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman; state court’s harmlessness determination was not unreasonable under AEDPA |
| Refusal to give heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction | Denial deprived him of due process by omitting a recognized lesser offense theory | Jury was properly instructed on second-degree murder and on voluntary manslaughter based on unreasonable self-defense; felony-murder/felony special-circumstance finding made error harmless | Error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; state court’s Chapman analysis reasonable |
| Ineffective assistance at penalty phase (failure to present mental/brain mitigation) | Counsel was constitutionally ineffective for tactical refusal to present extensive mental-health/organic brain-damage evidence | Counsel conducted thorough investigation and reasonably decided not to present conflicting psychiatric/brain evidence that would be discoverable and could open prejudicial rebuttal | No Strickland violation: counsel’s decision was a reasonable strategic choice and not deficient under AEDPA’s doubly deferential review |
| Cumulative error | Combined effect of errors deprived him of a fair trial | No significant constitutional errors to accumulate; single assumed errors were harmless | No cumulative-error relief because no prejudicial constitutional errors were shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-part ineffective-assistance test)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for constitutional errors)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (substantial and injurious effect standard for habeas prejudice)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (deference in AEDPA review; reasons that could support state decision)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (limits on new evidence in AEDPA review; summary denials review standard)
- Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257 (review of Chapman harmlessness under AEDPA)
- McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.) (when character evidence may render trial fundamentally unfair)
- Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918 (9th Cir.) (erroneous evidentiary rulings are grounds for habeas relief only if they render trial fundamentally unfair)
- Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (counsel’s duty to investigate; distinguishable when counsel had information but made tactical choice)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (ineffective-assistance precedent regarding investigation failures)