Gregory Brown v. M. Atchley
76 F.4th 862
9th Cir.2023Background
- Gregory Brown was convicted (1998) of conspiracy to commit murder and aiding-and-abetting attempted murder and sentenced to 56 years-to-life; initial federal habeas (1998) denied and a second federal habeas was dismissed in 2016.
- California enacted SB 1437 (effective Jan 1, 2019), amending felony-murder/natural-and-probable-consequences doctrines and adding Penal Code §1170.95 to permit retroactive resentencing petitions.
- Brown filed a §1170.95 resentencing application in Feb 2019; the trial court denied it (March 8, 2019); California appellate courts and the California Supreme Court affirmed the denial by Jan 2021.
- Brown filed federal habeas petitions in May 2020 and April 2021 challenging the denial and alleging due process, equal protection, and ineffective assistance of counsel in the §1170.95 proceedings.
- The district court dismissed those federal petitions as second or successive under AEDPA §2244(b) for lack of prior authorization; the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding Brown’s constitutional claims were not second or successive because they were unripe at the time of his earlier petitions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brown’s 2020–2021 federal petitions were “second or successive” under AEDPA §2244(b) | Brown: claims arose only after state denied his §1170.95 application in Mar 2019, so they were not ripe earlier and are not second or successive | Govt: petitions attack same underlying conviction/sentence and thus are second or successive requiring appellate authorization | Held: Ninth Circuit reversed—claims were unripe until denial in 2019, so petitions are not second or successive and dismissal under §2244(b) was error |
| Whether the state court’s denial of a §1170.95 petition constitutes a “new judgment” for Magwood purposes, making a later habeas not second or successive | Brown (relying on Clayton): denial of resentencing is a new legal event/judgment that can be challenged without AEDPA gatekeeping | Govt: some district courts and Clayton treat it as new; but California precedent (Hampton) treats initial eligibility rulings as post‑judgment, not a new custodial judgment | Held: Majority did not decide Magwood issue (reversed on ripeness ground); concurring opinion urged that denial under §1170.95 is not a new judgment under state law (Hampton) |
| Whether appellate authorization under §2244(b)(3)(A) was required before filing these federal petitions | Brown: authorization not required because petitions were not second or successive | Govt: authorization required if petitions challenge same conviction/sentence | Held: Authorization was not required because the petitions were not second or successive (they were based on claims first ripe in 2019) |
Key Cases Cited
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (interpreting “second or successive” with respect to the judgment challenged)
- Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (AEDPA doesn’t apply to claims filed when first ripe; ripeness exception for certain post‑conviction claims)
- McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (abuse‑of‑the‑writ doctrine background)
- Buenrostro v. United States, 638 F.3d 720 (9th Cir.) (applying ripeness principle to second‑in‑time petitions)
- Clayton v. Biter, 868 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2017) (held denial of resentencing under a California resentencing statute was an appealable order and characterized as a new judgment)
- People v. Hampton, 74 Cal. App. 5th 1092 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022) (threshold §1170.95 prima facie eligibility determination is a post‑judgment order, not a new custodial judgment)
- Martinez‑Villareal v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 637 (ripeness of competence‑to‑be‑executed claims)