Gregg, G. v. Ameriprise Financial, Aplts., 245 A.3d 637

In 1999 the Greggs hired Ameriprise adviser Robert Kovalchik, who recommended surrendering existing life policies and IRAs to buy a new variable life policy and new IRAs; the Greggs followed his advice.
Kovalchik diverted funds (including promised Policy deposits and monthly $300 payments) into other accounts and IRA transactions that increased his commissions, and the Greggs forewent a military survivor benefit based on his counsel.
The Greggs sued Ameriprise, Riversource/IDS, and Kovalchik asserting CPL catch‑all (Section 201‑2(4)(xxi)), fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent supervision.
A jury returned defense verdicts on the common‑law fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims; the CPL catch‑all claim was tried to the court, which found Ameriprise liable and awarded damages and attorneys’ fees.
The Superior Court affirmed, holding that the CPL’s prohibition on “fraudulent or deceptive conduct” requires only that the conduct have the tendency or capacity to deceive and does not depend on the actor’s state of mind.
The Supreme Court affirmed: under the plain language of the 1996 amendment and precedent (including Golden Gate and TAP), “deceptive conduct” in the CPL is not dependent on proof of intent or negligence and functions as a strict‑liability‑style standard, while private actions still require justifiable reliance and ascertainable loss under §201‑9.2.

Issue	Gregg's Argument	Ameriprise's Argument	Held
Whether “deceptive conduct” in the CPL’s catch‑all requires proof of the actor’s state of mind	“Deceptive” is broader than common‑law fraud and needs only the capacity/tendency to mislead; no intent required	“Deceptive” implies intent; CPL should require at least negligence or intent to mislead; 1996 amendment did not impose strict liability	Court held no state‑of‑mind element is required; deceptive conduct judged by tendency/capacity to deceive (strict‑liability–like)
Whether the jury’s defense verdict on common‑law claims precludes the CPL claim (res judicata/collateral estoppel)	CPL claim is independent; different standards so common‑law verdicts do not bar statutory claim	The defense verdict on misrepresentation should preclude CPL recovery	Court agreed with trial and Superior Courts that the CPL claim is distinct and was properly decided for the Greggs

Commonwealth v. TAP Pharm. Prods., 36 A.3d 1197 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (adopts test that deceptive conduct is conduct having tendency or capacity to deceive)
Commonwealth by Creamer v. Monumental Props., 329 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1974) (CPL is remedial and must be construed liberally to eradicate unfair/deceptive practices)
Commonwealth by Shapiro v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care LLC, 194 A.3d 1010 (Pa. 2018) (an act/practice is deceptive if it has capacity/tendency to deceive; intent need not be proved)
FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (U.S. 1934) (defines deceptive conduct in consumer protection as conduct with capacity to deceive)
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1967) (deceptiveness assessed by capacity to deceive; intent is not controlling)
Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555 (Pa. 1999) (elements of common‑law fraudulent misrepresentation)
Schwartz v. Rockey, 932 A.2d 885 (Pa. 2007) (private CPL actions require justifiable reliance derived from §201‑9.2)
Bennett v. A.T. Masterpiece, 40 A.3d 145 (Pa. Super. 2012) (Superior Court recognition that 1996 insertion of “deceptive” broadened catch‑all to include deceptive conduct)
Commonwealth v. Percudani, 825 A.2d 743 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (construed 1996 amendment to eliminate exclusive pre‑1996 fraud requirement)