Greer v. Finest Auto Wholesale, Inc.
156 N.E.3d 1005
Ohio Ct. App.2020Background
- In Nov. 2016 Dr. Greer (an individual) inspected and arranged purchase of a 2012 Mercedes listed by Finest Auto; Cortex Television, LLC (Dr. Greer’s company) was the titled purchaser. After delivery, Dr. Greer discovered signs the car had been in an accident.
- Cortex/Greer took the car to Leikin Motor Companies for inspection/repairs; Leikin allegedly assured them the car had not been in an accident and charged an agreed price; later a Columbus dealer said the car had been in a collision.
- Plaintiffs sued Finest Auto and Leikin (filed May 2017). The amended complaint alleged fraud/misrepresentation, negligent/consumer-practice claims (CSPA), and breach of contract (Cortex v. Finest; Cortex v. Leikin). Cortex (an LLC) and Dr. Greer filed a joint brief on appeal.
- Procedurally: defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings; the trial court dismissed some CSPA claims as non-consumer transactions and dismissed some contract claims. Finest obtained summary judgment on counts one and two; Leikin later obtained summary judgment on remaining fraud/negligent-misrep claims. Plaintiffs proceeded largely pro se after counsel withdrew.
- On appeal the Ninth District: affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded—holding the sale to the LLC was not a CSPA transaction, but remanding Leikin-related CSPA and contract/misrepresentation issues for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the sale of the Mercedes to Cortex was a "consumer transaction" under the Ohio CSPA | Greer: purchase was for his personal/family use and thus qualifies under the CSPA | Finest: title shows purchaser was Cortex (an LLC), not an individual, so no CSPA protection | Court: Sale to Cortex (an LLC) is not a consumer transaction under R.C. 1345.01(A) per Culbreath; CSPA claim against Finest affirmed dismissed |
| Whether Leikin’s inspection/repair was a consumer transaction under the CSPA | Greer/Cortex: services were purchased (allegedly by Greer) for personal use; therefore CSPA applies to Leikin | Leikin: no consumer transaction between it and Greer/Cortex (and any agreement was with Finest) | Court: Trial court erred to resolve this on pleadings; factual dispute whether an individual purchased Leikin’s services—remand for determination |
| Whether amended complaint adequately pleaded breach of contract against Leikin | Cortex: alleged express agreement to inspect/diagnose, payment, breach, damages; notice pleading suffices | Leikin: no contract with Cortex/Greer—agreement was with Finest; no written contract attached | Court: Complaint sufficiently alleges a contract and performance; judgment on the pleadings for Leikin on breach reversed and claim reinstated |
| Whether trial court properly granted summary judgment to Leikin on negligent misrepresentation (and whether pro se filings by Greer could be treated as Cortex’s filings) | Greer/Cortex: trial court misapplied burdens and improperly considered pro se filings for the LLC; genuine issues remain | Leikin: moved and argued no triable issue; trial court granted summary judgment | Court: Trial court erred by not first determining whether Leikin met initial summary-judgment burden and by treating Cortex’s claims via Greer’s pro se filings; remand for correct summary-judgment analysis |
| Whether Civ.R. 60(B) relief was available to vacate Finest’s summary judgment and whether prior judge’s orders should be vacated after recusal | Greer: counsel’s failure to oppose Finest’s motion was law-office error; prior orders should be vacated after recusal | Finest/Visiting judge: the order was not final (no Civ.R. 54(B)); Civ.R. 60(B) improper; prior judge’s pre-recusal orders are not automatically voidable | Court: Denial of Civ.R. 60(B) was proper because the targeted order was not final and Greer could not represent Cortex pro se; refusal to vacate prior pre-recusal orders was not error |
Key Cases Cited
- Culbreath v. Golding Ents., L.L.C., 114 Ohio St.3d 357 (2007) (construed "individual" in Ohio CSPA to mean "natural person," excluding business entities from consumer-transaction protection)
- Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102 (1996) (standard for appellate de novo review of summary judgment)
- Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (1977) (elements and standard for summary-judgment practice in Ohio)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (1996) (moving party’s initial burden in Ohio summary-judgment practice and nonmoving party’s reciprocal burden)
- Fletcher v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 120 Ohio St.3d 167 (2008) (Civ.R. 10(D)(1) pleading and requirement to attach written instruments vs. notice pleading)
- Disciplinary Counsel v. Kafele, 108 Ohio St.3d 283 (2006) (corporate entities and LLCs may only be represented by licensed counsel in court)
- Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co., 13 Ohio App.3d 7 (6th Dist. 1983) (Ohio summary-judgment standards)
- State ex rel. Leneghan v. Husted, 154 Ohio St.3d 60 (2018) (rules on written instruments attached to pleadings and Civ.R. 10(C))