Greenway v. Schriro
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15529
| 9th Cir. | 2011Background
- Greenway was convicted and sentenced to death in 1989 for the 1988 murders of Lili Champagne and Mindy Peters.
- Post-conviction relief was pursued in state court under Rule 32; initial petition was denied and amended petitions followed.
- During post-conviction proceedings, Greenway disclosed a brief, decades-old connection between the trial judge and a man who had been married to one victim’s husband; disqualification motion was denied as moot.
- Greenway filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court denied relief on several grounds.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial on most issues but remanded for merits review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims at trial and on direct appeal, due to procedural questions about state grounds.
- The court also addressed claims of ineffective assistance at sentencing, judicial bias, and whether mitigating factors were properly considered by state courts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is Rule 32.2(a)(3) an adequate independent bar to federal review? | Greenway contends Rule 32.2(a)(3) bars federal review only if there was a prior collateral proceeding. | State relied on Rule 32.2(a)(3) as an adequate bar to preclude review of new IAC claims. | Not an adequate independent bar; remand for merits review. |
| Whether Greenway fairly exhausted the mitigating-evidence claim. | Amended petition fairly presented the mitigating-evidence issue to the state court. | Exhaustion not satisfied because the claim was not raised in the original petition. | Fairly presented and exhausted; review on the merits is appropriate. |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing. | Counsel failed to investigate/present substantial mitigating evidence. | Counsel adequately investigated and presented mitigating evidence. | Not objectively unreasonable under Strickland; denial affirmed. |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not calling Dr. David to testify at sentencing. | Calling Dr. David would have helped present mitigating evidence. | Strategic decision not to call Dr. David due to prejudicial cross-examination effects. | Strategic decision reasonable; no deficient performance. |
| Did the judge’s alleged relationship with a victim’s family create judicial bias requiring reversal? | Judge Scholl had a tangential, long-ago relationship suggesting bias. | Relationship was too remote and insubstantial to affect impartiality. | No colorable bias; no evidentiary hearing required. |
Key Cases Cited
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (adequacy/independence of state grounds for procedural default)
- Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2009) (exhaustion and merits-review framework; Scott v. Rodriguez guidance)
- Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (Rule 32.2(a)(3) not always adequate bar; exhaustion considerations)
- State v. Rodriguez, 183 Ariz. 331, 903 P.2d 639 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (amendment rights under Arizona post-conviction rules)
- Schad v. Ryan, 606 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (mitigating-factor analysis under Tennard/Smith standards)