537 S.W.3d 501
Tex.2017Background
- Paul Green worked as a bus monitor for Dallas County Schools (DCS); he disclosed congestive heart failure and use of diuretics.
- On August 30, 2011, after urgently needing a restroom, Green involuntarily urinated on himself on a bus when the driver delayed stopping; he contained most urine in a bottle and did not wet the bus seat.
- DCS terminated Green for "unprofessional conduct" and exposure of students to bodily fluids; Green appealed internally and then sued under the Texas Labor Code alleging disability discrimination.
- At trial the parties stipulated Green was a qualified individual with a disability; the jury found DCS terminated Green because of his disability and awarded damages.
- The court of appeals reversed, treating congestive heart failure as Green’s sole disability and holding Green failed to prove that his heart condition caused the incontinence that led to termination.
- The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding the jury could have found urinary incontinence itself was a disability and that evidence supported that DCS knew of it and terminated Green because of it.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Green’s urinary incontinence can be treated as a separate disability under the Texas Labor Code | Green: incontinence (and side effects of meds) is a disability and the reason for termination | DCS: Green never argued incontinence as a distinct disability at trial/appeal and offered no evidence of disability‑level chronic incontinence | Held: Incontinence can itself qualify as a disability; jury charge and evidence allowed that finding |
| Whether Green had to prove his congestive heart failure caused the incontinence | Green: law does not require proving cause of a disability; he need only show DCS terminated him because of the disability | DCS: court of appeals correctly required proof that heart condition caused incontinence because heart failure was the only identified disability | Held: Rejected court of appeals’ approach—Green need not show heart failure caused the incontinence when incontinence itself can be a disability |
| Whether there was evidence that DCS knew of Green’s incontinence | Green: testimony showed multiple drivers knew and Green informed supervisors and the decisionmaker about medication causing urgency | DCS: Drivers’ knowledge irrelevant because decisionmaker did not know; no evidence decisionmaker knew of chronic incontinence | Held: Under the unobjected jury instruction that employer knowledge may be shown through employees, evidence sufficed that DCS knew of Green’s incontinence |
| Sufficiency of evidence to support jury’s disability‑discrimination verdict | Green: testimony, multiple physician explanations of incontinence, prior unscheduled stops by other drivers, and the jury charge support verdict | DCS: Incident was an isolated embarrassing episode, not disability‑level impairment; no proof of chronic condition or causation | Held: Evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding that incontinence was a disability and a motivating factor in termination; remanded to court of appeals for unresolved issues |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. City of Grapevine, 188 S.W.3d 748 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied) (elements of Texas disability discrimination claim)
- Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090 (5th Cir. 1996) (federal framing of disability discrimination elements)
- City of Houston v. Proler, 437 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. 2014) (consideration of federal civil rights law in Texas employment discrimination cases)
- Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 446 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. 2014) (preservation of issues and construing jury charges)
- Romero v. KPH Consol., Inc., 166 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2005) (measure sufficiency of evidence by the jury charge when unobjected)
- Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2001) (source of impairment generally irrelevant to whether condition is a disability)
- Scavetta v. Dillon Cos., [citation="569 F. App'x 622"] (10th Cir. 2014) (evidence must support that a condition substantially limits the relevant bodily function)