Green Party v. Hargett, 953 F. Supp. 2d 816

Plaintiffs Green Party of Tennessee and Constitutional Party of Tennessee sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tre Hargett and Mark Goins over ballot access and recognition in Tennessee elections.
Plaintiffs allege Tennessee ballot-access statutes (notably 2-1-104(a)(24), 2-5-101(a)(l), 2-13-202/203, and 2-5-208(d)(1)) burden First Amendment rights to associate and voters’ rights to vote for minor parties’ candidates.
This action follows a prior 2010–2011 action (Goins) that held the 2.5% petition and 119-day deadline unconstitutional; statutes were revised in 2012 and challenged anew on remand by the Sixth Circuit.
On remand, the court granted renewed summary judgment for Plaintiffs, retaining that the 2.5% signature requirement and the 90-day general-election recognition petition deadline remain unconstitutional as applied, and that the ballot-order provision creates a voting cue violation.
The court also found the 2012 amendments’ 90-day petition deadline still imposes an undue burden when combined with the 2.5% threshold, and that the 2-5-208(d)(1) preferential ballot ordering violates equal protection by furnishing a voting cue to major-party candidates.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the 2.5% signature requirement unconstitutional as applied?	Plaintiffs argue the 2.5% threshold burdens First Amendment rights to organize minor parties.	Defendants argue the requirement serves legitimate state interests and is not a total ban on ballot access.	Yes; 2.5% burden is unconstitutional as applied.
Is the 90-day general-election petition deadline unconstitutional as applied?	Plaintiffs contend the 90-day deadline continues to unduly burden ballot access despite 2012 amendments.	Defendants contend the 90-day deadline is a reasonable administrative deadline and not inherently unconstitutional.	Yes; 90-day deadline remains unconstitutional as applied.
Does Tenn. 2-5-208(d)(1) ballot order violate equal protection by creating a voting cue?	Pls argue preferential placement for the majority party harms minor parties and voters.	Defs claim no constitutional right to favorable placement and evidence of bias is inconclusive.	Yes; ballot-order statute violates equal protection.
Do Plaintiffs have standing to challenge these ballot-access provisions?	Plaintiffs maintain ongoing injury to their ballot access rights despite not pursuing primaries.	Defs assert lack of injury since parties may not seek primary nomination.	Yes; Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the statutes.

Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (standing to challenge ballot-access restrictions; minority parties may sue)
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (standing for independent candidates to challenge ballot-access rules)
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (balancing test for burdens on political rights; framework for reviewing ballot access)
American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (modicum of support; fixed-percent requirements with outer limits)
Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Blackwell, 462 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizes undue burden of signature/deadline schemes on minor parties)
New Alliance Party v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 861 F.Supp.282 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (authoritative ballot-position studies cited in evaluating primacy effects)
McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980) (evidence of ballot-position bias in office ballots; primacy effects)