Green Party of Tennessee v. Tre Hargett
767 F.3d 533
6th Cir.2014Background
- Green Party of Tennessee and Constitution Party of Tennessee sued state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking minor-party ballot access and challenging Tennessee’s party-ordering statute.
- Pre-2012 regime: parties could gain ballot access either by (1) reaching 5% in a statewide race (automatic) or (2) filing a petition with signatures equaling 2.5% of prior gubernatorial vote by an early-April (119 days before primary) deadline; certain primaries were mandatory.
- In 2012 Tennessee amended the law: minor parties may nominate by their own rules (avoiding primary) but then must file petitions 90 days before the general election; parties that hold primaries remain subject to the 119-day deadline and 2.5% requirement.
- District court twice granted plaintiffs summary judgment invalidating (a) the 2.5% requirement combined with the filing deadline and (b) the preferential party-ordering statute; this Court previously reversed in part and remanded because of the statutory amendments and incomplete factual record.
- On remand the district court again granted plaintiffs summary judgment; this Court (panel) now holds plaintiffs have standing but reverses summary judgment on both ballot-access and ballot-ordering claims and vacates the attorney-fees award for recalculation, remanding for factual development.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to sue | Plaintiffs claim Tennessee’s ballot rules (esp. 2.5% rule and deadlines) injure their associational and speech rights and have practical effect on their political activity | Defendants argue statutory amendments give plaintiffs alternative routes (nomination by party rules, later 90-day deadline) and thus plaintiffs lack a concrete injury | Court: Plaintiffs have standing; continuing 2.5% requirement and past/actual effects establish concrete, particularized injury |
| 2.5% signature requirement + deadlines (Ballot access) | 2.5% requirement combined with early deadlines and Tennessee’s overall framework imposes a severe First Amendment burden making ballot access effectively impossible | State defends 2.5% as a permissible show of support and cites administrative interests (ballot preparation, avoiding confusion); argues changes eased burdens | Court: 2.5% not facially invalid; existing record is insufficient to determine whether current scheme (including 90-day/119-day options) imposes a severe burden — reverse summary judgment and remand for further factual development |
| Preferential ballot-ordering statute | Preferential party ordering (majority, minority, recognized minor) gives entrenched parties advantage; empirical evidence shows ballot position affects votes hence violates First and Fourteenth Amendments | State contends plaintiffs lacked evidence that order affects Tennessee voters; ballots are formatted (party-block) in ways that reduce ordering effects | Court: Factual dispute exists about whether order affects voter behavior; record (conflicting studies and ballots) insufficient for summary judgment — reverse and remand for development |
| Attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 | Plaintiffs argue they were prevailing parties when district court initially enjoined old statutes and are entitled to fees for district-court litigation | Defendants argue appellate reversal and statutory changes negate prevailing-party status and fee entitlement | Court: Plaintiffs were prevailing parties as to the district court’s initial judgment; however district court abused discretion in awarding full fees without reassessing after partial reversal and statutory changes — vacate fee award and remand for recalculation |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (U.S. 1983) (announces the burden-balancing framework for election-law challenges)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (U.S. 1992) (clarifies severity-of-burden inquiry and tailoring under Anderson)
- Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (U.S. 1971) (upholds petition-signature requirements as permissible means to show party support)
- American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (U.S. 1974) (approves certain party-support thresholds and upholds petition requirements under constitutional standards)
- Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (U.S. 1974) (examines additional petition-circulation restrictions that can make a signature threshold unconstitutional)
- Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Blackwell, 462 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2006) (balances deadline timing and signature thresholds; factual context can render early deadlines unconstitutional)
- McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980) (analyzes preferential ballot-ordering and notes empirical questions about position effects)
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (U.S. 2001) (defines "prevailing party" for attorney-fee awards)
- Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (U.S. 1968) (recognizes ballot access as integral to associational and voting rights)
