Green Party of Arkansas v. Martin
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16365
| 8th Cir. | 2011Background
- Green Party of Arkansas sought a declaration that it is a political party and that Ark. Code § 7-1-101(21)(C) violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
- Arkansas allows ballot access via certified parties, new parties via a 10,000-signature petition, and other paths for President/VP access and independents via petition; durability as a party depends on meeting a 3% threshold in Governor or presidential electors’ vote.
- Green Party petitioned to become a new party in 2006, 2008, and 2010, obtaining ballot access each time but ultimately losing party status after those elections due to failures to reach 3%.
- District court granted summary judgment for Arkansas; Green Party appealed contending § 7-1-101(21)(C) burdens associational rights and was misinterpreted.
- On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the ballot access scheme does not impose a severe burden on the Green Party’s rights and upheld the district court’s decision.
- The court analyzed the burden, the state’s regulatory interests, and examined comparable federal authorities to conclude the statute is constitutionally permissible.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 7-1-101(21)(C) severely burden associational rights? | Green Party contends it forces association with unwanted races or costly petitions. | Arkansas argues the burden is not severe and serves regulatory interests. | No; burden is not severe. |
| Are Arkansas's regulatory interests sufficient to justify § 7-1-101(21)(C)? | The measures are unnecessary and discriminatory against non-major parties. | Ballot integrity, preventing overcrowding, frivolous candidacies, and voter confusion justify restrictions. | Yes; interests are sufficiently weighty to justify the restrictions. |
| Should the Court apply strict scrutiny given the burden on associational rights? | Rule demands strict scrutiny due to severe burden. | Not every burden triggers strict scrutiny; lesser burden applies here. | Less-than-strict scrutiny applies; burdens are not severe. |
Key Cases Cited
- California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (ballot access laws and primary participation concerns)
- Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (internal party affairs and associational rights)
- Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1987) (party independence and associational rights)
- Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (sliding standard of review for election regulations; burden distinctions)
- Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (standard of review for election regulations; not all burdens trigger strict scrutiny)
- Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (petition requirements and reasonable access to ballot)
- Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) (empirical evidence not required to justify ballot restrictions)
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (regulatory interests; substantial regulation may be necessary)
- Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (ballot access considerations in party regulation)
- Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (state control over elections; neutrality and access considerations)