Greater Houston Partnership v. Ken Paxton, Texas Attorney General And Jim Jenkins
468 S.W.3d 51
| Tex. | 2015Background
- Greater Houston Partnership (GHP) is a private, nonprofit chamber‑of‑commerce–style organization that provides marketing, consulting, and event services; ~90% of revenue from members, <8% from City of Houston contracts at issue (2007–2008).
- GHP contracted with the City under annual professional‑services agreements for economic‑development work; payments were made quarterly in arrears contingent on performance reports; 2008 contract expressly stated it was not subject to the Texas Public Information Act (TPIA).
- A requester sought GHP’s 2007–2008 check registers under the TPIA, arguing GHP is a “governmental body” because it "spends or is supported in whole or in part by public funds." GHP refused and sought AG review.
- The Attorney General and the trial court concluded GHP was a governmental body under the Kneeland framework; the court of appeals affirmed over a dissent.
- The Texas Supreme Court reviewed whether “supported in whole or in part by public funds” includes private vendors paid under arm’s‑length contracts or only entities financially sustained by public funds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of “supported in whole or in part by public funds” under TPIA | GHP: unambiguously requires that public funds sustain existence (sustenance), not mere contract payments | AG: ambiguous; includes entities receiving public funds under contracts; narrow reading would undermine transparency | Court: term unambiguous in context — means ‘‘sustained’’ (financially dependent) in whole or in part by public funds (i.e., could not operate without them) |
| Application to private vendor contracts / quid pro quo payments | GHP: arm’s‑length, specific measurable services paid as consideration are not “support” | AG: government payments that further public purpose can render entity supported | Court: quid pro quo vendor payments that compensate for specific measurable services do not make entity a governmental body; only financial dependence qualifies |
| Role of Kneeland v. NCAA and AG informal rulings | GHP: Kneeland not required if statutory text unambiguous | AG & lower courts: Kneeland is the governing multi‑factor test | Court: did not apply Kneeland because statutory language unambiguous; Kneeland and many AG rulings are persuasive elsewhere but not necessary here |
| Scope of “in part” — can small public funding alone trigger TPIA? | GHP: small percentage of revenue (<8%) means not supported in part | AG: “in part” could capture partial funding relationships | Court: “in part” retained but means partial sustenance of the relevant part/portion; mere small quid‑pro‑quo payments that are not sustaining do not qualify GHP |
Key Cases Cited
- Kneeland v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988) (articulated multi‑factor test for when privately organized entities are treated as public under Texas open‑records law)
- Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (U.S. 1980) (federal FOIA precedent requires extensive government control/supervision to treat private entities as agencies)
- Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Att’y Gen. of Tex., 354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010) (construing TPIA exemptions and noting FOIA as model for TPIA interpretation)
- City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. 2000) (statutory construction principles and de novo review of public‑information questions)
- Jackson v. State Office of Admin. Hearings, 351 S.W.3d 290 (Tex. 2011) (discussing the TPIA’s purpose and liberal‑construction mandate)