Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama
992 F.3d 1299
11th Cir.
2021

Background

  • Plaintiffs (Greater Birmingham Ministries, Alabama State Conference of the NAACP, and individual voters) challenged Alabama’s 2011 photo‑ID law (HB19) as racially discriminatory under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, §2 and §201 of the Voting Rights Act.
  • HB19 requires photo ID for in‑person and absentee voting but permits provisional ballots with a cure deadline and a “positively identify” regular‑ballot accommodation by two election officials.
  • The District Court granted summary judgment for Secretary of State Merrill; a divided Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed; a petition for rehearing en banc was denied with multiple judges filing separate statements.
  • The record contains competing expert estimates of Alabama voters lacking a qualifying ID (estimates range roughly from 1.03% to 1.67% of registered voters), showing small percentage disparities between white and minority voters but statistically significant ratios indicating minorities are more likely to lack IDs; at least 2,197 provisional ballots were rejected for lack of qualifying ID with racial disparities in rejections.
  • Plaintiffs introduced legislative history and recorded statements by lawmakers (including Senators Dixon and Beason) and evidence about limited accessibility of mobile ID units and travel burdens; the panel majority resolved factual disputes at summary judgment in favor of the State, while dissents argued those were triable issues.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether Crawford v. Marion County controls analysis of race‑discrimination and §2 claims challenging a photo‑ID law Crawford is inapplicable to race‑motivated claims; race claims require a different analysis and evidence of intent/effect Crawford recognizes legitimate state interests in preventing fraud and legitimizes photo‑ID laws under the Anderson‑Burdick framework Panel relied on Crawford to assess state interests and pretext; dissent argued Crawford is inapposite for race/§2 claims but the panel affirmed for the majority
Whether Gingles factors apply to §2 vote‑denial claims Gingles and the Senate factors apply (or at least provide relevant guidance) in §2 vote‑denial cases to connect disparate effects to historical/social conditions Gingles arose in vote‑dilution context and many of its factors do not fit vote‑denial claims; Gingles is inapplicable or of limited use here Panel questioned applicability of Gingles to vote‑denial claims and treated several Gingles factors as inapt; dissent insisted Gingles/Senate factors inform §2 vote‑denial analysis
Whether the record presented genuine disputes of material fact on discriminatory impact (summary judgment standard) Expert evidence and statistics create triable disputes on disparate impact, access burdens, and ballot rejections—summary judgment inappropriate Disparities are numerically small (roughly 1% difference); available accommodations (provisional cure, mobile units, ID issuance) negate a substantial disparate effect Panel accepted numerical smallness and affirmed summary judgment for State; dissent argued the panel improperly weighed evidence and should have left impact questions to factfinder
Whether legislative statements and history create triable issues of discriminatory intent Recorded statements by lawmakers, contemporaneous legislative departures, and historical background provide circumstantial evidence that race was a motivating factor Statements were not directly about HB19 or were made by retired legislators; State offered neutral justifications and absence of direct admissions Panel found no reasonable factfinder could infer discriminatory intent from the record; dissent argued those facts suffice to create a triable issue under Arlington Heights and related precedent

Key Cases Cited

  • Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (upheld Indiana photo‑ID requirement under Anderson‑Burdick and recognized state interests in preventing voter fraud)
  • Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (articulated multi‑factor framework and Senate factors for §2 claims)
  • Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (established framework for proving discriminatory intent; motive as a motivating factor suffices)
  • Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (held small numerical effects can be actionable where driven by racial discrimination)
  • Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (rejected that Crawford compels rejection of §2 race‑discrimination challenges to photo‑ID laws)
  • N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016) (enjoined North Carolina photo‑ID law on disparate impact grounds; distinguished Crawford)
  • Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2012) (summary judgment standard: courts may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations)
  • Williams v. City of Dothan, 818 F.2d 755 (11th Cir. 1987) (disparate‑effect analysis should focus on relative rates, not absolute numbers)
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