966 F.3d 1202
11th Cir.2020Background
- In 2011 Alabama enacted a photo voter ID law (HB19, Ala. Code § 17-9-30) requiring specified photo IDs for in-person and absentee voting; it went into effect in June 2014. The statute also authorizes a Secretary-issued photo voter ID, a mobile ID unit, and a “positively identify provision” (PIP) allowing two election officials to attest a voter’s identity.
- Plaintiffs (Greater Birmingham Ministries, Alabama NAACP, and individual Black and Latino voters) sued Secretary of State John Merrill alleging the law was motivated by racial discrimination and has a racially disparate effect, violating the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), and § 201 of the VRA (tests/devices). They sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
- Plaintiffs’ proofs: statistical estimates that between ~32,700 and ~118,000 registered Alabamians lack acceptable photo ID (racial disparities of roughly 1%–1.5%); legislative statements by some legislators (including racist comments by certain individuals made before or around passage); and examples of voter burdens (transportation, costs to replace documents).
- State’s proofs: Alabama accepts a broad array of photo IDs (driver’s license, state photo voter ID, passport, student/employee/government/military/tribal IDs), issues free photo voter IDs, has a mobile unit and home-visit option, MOUs to provide free birth/marriage certificates and to waive nondriver ID fees, and extensive voter-education spending. The PIP had been precleared in 2003.
- Procedural posture: District court granted Merrill summary judgment on all claims; plaintiffs appealed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding plaintiffs failed to create genuine disputes of material fact showing discriminatory intent or that the law results in vote denial. Judge Gayles dissented.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2011 voter ID law violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by being enacted with racially discriminatory intent and effect | HB19 was motivated in part by racial animus (legislative statements, contemporaneous bills, and Alabama’s history) and has a disparate impact on minority voters | The law advances neutral, weighty state interests (preventing fraud, modernizing elections, protecting confidence), accepts many ID types, and provides free/easily obtainable IDs and alternatives (PIP, provisional ballots) | Affirmed for defendant: plaintiffs failed to show discriminatory intent under Arlington Heights and no reasonable factfinder could find the law enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose |
| Whether the law violates §2 of the Voting Rights Act (results test) | Disparate ID possession rates and practical burdens (transportation, costs, language) result in minorities having less opportunity to participate | Disparities are small (≈1% difference); state mitigations (free IDs, mobile unit, alternative voting paths) mean the law does not cause vote denial; plaintiffs must show causation | Affirmed for defendant: plaintiffs did not show the law “results in” denial or abridgement on account of race under the totality of circumstances; Gingles framework inapplicable to this vote-denial claim |
| Whether the PIP is an unlawful “test or device” under §201 of the VRA (voucher prohibition) | PIP effectively requires voters without ID to be vouched for by officials, functioning as a forbidden voucher/test and enabling subjective, discriminatory application | PIP is a permissive fail-safe, not a prerequisite; voters can present ID, cast provisional ballots and cure, or obtain free IDs; PIP was precleared in 2003 | Affirmed for defendant: PIP is not a prohibited test or device because it is not a mandatory prerequisite to vote and increases, not restricts, voting opportunities |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate on these claims | Summary judgment inappropriate because disputed material facts exist (impact, intent, adequacy of mitigations like mobile unit) requiring trial | No genuine disputes of material fact; record establishes neutral law with robust mitigating measures; Judge must not weigh credibility at summary judgment | Affirmed for defendant (majority): no genuine material factual disputes that could lead a reasonable factfinder to find discrimination; dissent argued the record presents triable issues on impact and intent |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (upholding an Indiana photo-ID law; balancing burdens on voting against state interests)
- Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (invalidating the VRA §4(b) coverage formula and ending federal preclearance for covered jurisdictions)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (flexible balancing test for election law burdens; severe burdens trigger strict scrutiny)
- Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (factors for inferring discriminatory intent from official action)
- Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (framework and Senate factors for §2 vote-dilution claims)
- Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (§2 requires proof of discriminatory results, not intent)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard: genuine dispute only if reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party)
- Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (discriminatory purpose requirement for equal protection challenges)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (benchmarks for evaluating circumstantial evidence and summary-judgment evaluation in discrimination cases)